[jayceeii]

Can you better explain “necessary being”? To me the concept has always seemed circular, that some being is necessary since something exists. But that doesn’t get around the Big Bang theory, that postulates something can appear from nothing from physical principles.

[Charles]

I mean by “necessary being” a concrete object (something that can stand in causal relations) that exists necessarily.

I should also mention that I am taking (1) for granted, since the Gap Problem is the problem of showing, given that there is a necessary being, why we should consider this being to be God. It’s a second step in an ontological argument, where the first step is to show that there is a necessary being.

[Charles]

Here’s perhaps a better way of putting the argument:

Define a “necessary being” as a concrete object that exists necessarily.

Define “God” as an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being who also has the further properties of Aseity and Sovereignty.

1. A necessary being, N, exists.

2. Possibly, God exists.

Now consider a possible world, W, where God and N exist. Assume God is not identical to N in W. Then God would not be the only self-existent being in W, and so lack Aseity. Nor would God be sovereign over N’s existence in W and so lack Sovereignty. Contradiction! So God is identical to N in W. But then God is identical to N in every possible world, and so:

3. God is identical to N.

• This reply was modified 12 months ago by  Charles.

[jayceeii]

These statements all seem definitional, with no “hooks” into the real world. It’s all kind of circular, as you define things the way you want them to be. For instance God has Aseity, which means He has to be the only self-existent being. Or, God has Sovereignty, which means He must reign over N. There is no implied or pursued knowledge of God.

[Charles]

The statements are definitional, though the definition of God is the classical conception of God. The definition of necessary being is one I’ve taken from Pruss.

I guess I don’t see the problem with defining terms the way we want, so long as we’re clear and we’re able to show the logical entailments of the definitions.

[jayceeii]

If you just make a definition you don’t know if it is really about God. You are just saying, “If there is a being with Aseity, He would be the only existent being.” It’s circular. I agree that’s the classical conception, yet the fact it was handed to us does not imply it is correct.

The proofs appear only to examine the definitions, with no guaranteed bearing on reality. I am not trying to be petulant, just wondering if what is being said is actual or imaginary. The language is beguiling in its complexity yet seems to evaporate for me as I examine it.

[Charles]

“If you just make a definition you don’t know if it is really about God.”

I don’t know what you mean. The definition I give is the classical definition of God. But even if that were not the case, I still don’t know why I can’t just say that by “God” what I mean is an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being etc., etc. If the argument shows that God, so defined, is identical to the necessary being shown to exist in an ontological argument, I think that would be significant.

“You are just saying, “If there is a being with Aseity, He would be the only existent being.” It’s circular.”

It’s not circular; it’s a definition. Being the only self existent being is what aseity means.

” I agree that’s the classical conception, yet the fact it was handed to us does not imply it is correct.”

I don’t know what you mean by a definition being “correct.” We can define words any way we want. So long as our definitions are clear and our logic is valid, I don’t see the problem.

Perhaps your worry is that the classical definition does not accurately portray the God of the Bible?

“The proofs appear only to examine the definitions, with no guaranteed bearing on reality.”

Premise (1) states that a necessary being exists. So it is saying something about reality.

Premise (2) states that God possibly exists, that is, exists in at least one possible world. As stated, it leaves open whether or not God actually exists, exists in the actual world.

(3) states that God is identical to N, which is a statement about reality.

“I am not trying to be petulant, just wondering if what is being said is actual or imaginary.”

I don’t think you are being petulant. I hope the above answer to your question makes clear that what is being said is actual, not imaginary.

” The language is beguiling in its complexity yet seems to evaporate for me as I examine it.”

You are raising some technical issues, so there is a lot of complexity when you dig deep down. Ontological arguments tend to rely on quantified modal systems that are extremely technical.

It sounds to me that your issue is with ontological arguments as such. My argument here assumes that one has given a sound ontological argument for the existence of a necessary being; what it seeks to show is that God is identical to this necessary being.

Believe it or not, there are many non-theists who except the existence of a necessary being. They wonder why one should think this necessary being is God. This is known as the Gap Problem, and my argument above is a proposal on how to solve this problem.

• This reply was modified 12 months ago by  Charles.

[jayceeii]

JC1: “If you just make a definition you don’t know if it is really about God.”

Charles: I don’t know what you mean. The definition I give is the classical definition of God. But even if that were not the case, I still don’t know why I can’t just say that by “God” what I mean is an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being etc., etc. If the argument shows that God, so defined, is identical to the necessary being shown to exist in an ontological argument, I think that would be significant.

JC2: Without God knowledge, which is to say independent or direct knowledge of what God is and what He is like, both these avenues are mere projections of the imagination, and showing links between them further projections. It’s all conditional. You are saying, “If there’s a being with these properties I imagine, we can make certain statements about it.” It takes you no closer to knowing if there is such a being in reality. Hence theological arguments never sway the masses. They are basically groundless.

JC1: “You are just saying, “If there is a being with Aseity, He would be the only existent being.” It’s circular.”

Charles: It’s not circular; it’s a definition. Being the only self existent being is what aseity means.

JC2: My issue was that you were trying to make something from this definition, to imply it gave you information about a real God. To remind you of your original argument:

Charles1: Now consider a possible world in which both N and God exist. In such a world, God would either be identical to N or be the ontological ground for N’s existence, since, if he isn’t either, he wouldn’t be the only self existing being (Aseity) nor be sovereign over N’s existence (Sovereignty).

JC2: You are basically saying that God would have to be N because you have defined Him that way, which is to say with Aseity and Sovereignty that negate the possibility of an N separate from God. But in all this N remains practically undefined except as an alternative term for God. You aren’t demonstrating there is some Being with Aseity and Sovereignty, instead showing you have the imagination to think about these concepts.

JC1: “I agree that’s the classical conception, yet the fact it was handed to us does not imply it is correct.”

Charles: I don’t know what you mean by a definition being “correct.” We can define words any way we want. So long as our definitions are clear and our logic is valid, I don’t see the problem.

JC2: We’re talking about metaphysics, where human imagination might not really apply. There is a classical conception about God, but it might tell us only about the human mind.

Charles: Perhaps your worry is that the classical definition does not accurately portray the God of the Bible?

JC2: What I’m really after is a meaningful definition for “necessary being,” that doesn’t amount to a subtle restatement of a possibly imaginary God-concept. The arguments appear to be attempts to look straight at God without reference to revelations about Him.

JC1: “The proofs appear only to examine the definitions, with no guaranteed bearing on reality.”

Charles: Premise (1) states that a necessary being exists. So it is saying something about reality.

JC2: Yes, but “necessary being” is not defined, except as an additional attribute of God, possibly imagined alongside the others of Aseity and Sovereignty. The statement tries to say something about reality but I haven’t seen a solid statement of what that something is.

Charles: Premise (2) states that God possibly exists, that is, exists in at least one possible world. As stated, it leaves open whether or not God actually exists, exists in the actual world.

JC2: Sure. But if worlds are created by God, He necessarily exists from the perspective of any of them. This is a reality that science may eventually discover. In the meantime your proof seems to amount to raw speculation.

Charles: (3) states that God is identical to N, which is a statement about reality.

JC2: Not when N remains undefined in any useful terms. It’s just another speculative property.

JC1: “I am not trying to be petulant, just wondering if what is being said is actual or imaginary.”

Charles: I don’t think you are being petulant. I hope the above answer to your question makes clear that what is being said is actual, not imaginary.

JC2: People at this forum have tended to grow defensive, when I’m just looking for objective truth, or trying to explore it from my angle. Again though it looks to me like N amounts to an additional speculative property added to a speculative God-concept.

JC1: ” The language is beguiling in its complexity yet seems to evaporate for me as I examine it.”

Charles: You are raising some technical issues, so there is a lot of complexity when you dig deep down. Ontological arguments tend to rely on quantified modal systems that are extremely technical.

JC2: Technicalities can obscure the fact there is nothing substantial in the argument. If the goal is to prove God’s existence, there must be more than speculation which may be peculiar to the human mind. This is the accusation of the atheists, to which theologians have had no satisfactory reply. If there were some truth in the arguments you should be able to convince the whole world of God’s existence. Instead when anyone digs into it these prove to be empty. Theologians say, “Dig some more,” but can’t do so themselves to present the argument in a cogent way which is comprehensible by anyone. It’s like being invited into a house of mirrors.

Charles: It sounds to me that your issue is with ontological arguments as such. My argument here assumes that one has given a sound ontological argument for the existence of a necessary being; what it seeks to show is that God is identical to this necessary being.

JC2: Again though I don’t think you have defined “necessary being” in a useful way, instead turning in circles with an additional supposed property of the imagined Deity. The arguments are like sleight-of-hand, you hide the property of necessary being, than act amazed when it turns up at the behest of the other properties.

Charles: Believe it or not, there are many non-theists who except the existence of a necessary being. They wonder why one should think this necessary being is God. This is known as the Gap Problem, and my argument above is a proposal on how to solve this problem.

JC2: Can you provide some links to non-theists who accept the existence of a necessary being? I’d want to see what that thinking is like, as there may be clues you haven’t yet been able to provide of a way to define necessary being non-interchangeably with God.

[Charles]

“Without God knowledge, which is to say independent or direct knowledge of what God is and what He is like, both these avenues are mere projections of the imagination, and showing links between them further projections.”

If the above argument is sound, God exists necessarily and is omnipotent, omniscient, etc., etc. That is “something God is like.”

“It’s all conditional. You are saying, “If there’s a being with these properties I imagine, we can make certain statements about it.”I’m sorry, but that is a mischaracterization of the argument.

” It takes you no closer to knowing if there is such a being in reality.”

The reasoning logically entails that such a being exists in reality. Take a careful look at the argument.

“Hence theological arguments never sway the masses. They are basically groundless.”

This is a non sequitur.

“My issue was that you were trying to make something from this definition, to imply it gave you information about a real God.”

You said the issue was that it was circular. It’s not circular.

The notion of Aseity as well as Sovereignty are the two notions that are doing the work in the argument, but I don’t see how that is a problem, so long as the conclusion follows. The only way to fault the argument is to show that these notions are somehow inconsistent or that the conclusion doesn’t follow from them.

“You are basically saying that God would have to be N because you have defined Him that way,”

No. I never defined God as a necessary being.

“which is to say with Aseity and Sovereignty that negate the possibility of an N separate from God.”

If you mean that N cannot be separate from given the definitions and premises of the argument, that’s right. That’s the whole point of the argument to show that. So long as the argument is valid, I don’t see a problem.

“But in all this N remains practically undefined except as an alternative term for God.”

No. Again, I am not using N and God interchangeably. I also gave a definition of N in the beginning of the argument, so it’s not undefined.

“You aren’t demonstrating there is some Being with Aseity and Sovereignty, instead showing you have the imagination to think about these concepts.”

No, the argument shows that such a being exists necessarily.

“We’re talking about metaphysics, where human imagination might not really apply. There is a classical conception about God, but it might tell us only about the human mind.”

So long as the definition isn’t logically or metaphysically inconsistent, there’s no problem. Perhaps your worry is that you suspect that the definition is metaphysically inconsistent in some way?

“What I’m really after is a meaningful definition for “necessary being,” that doesn’t amount to a subtle restatement of a possibly imaginary God-concept.”

I gave a definition of necessary being that doesn’t involve God. Again, the two terms are not interchangeable.

“The arguments appear to be attempts to look straight at God without reference to revelations about Him.”

I don’t know what you mean “look straight at God.” Nobody can do that in this life. The argument defines God, and it seems your worry (correct me if I’m wrong) is that we can’t really do this with our human minds. Am I right?

“Yes, but “necessary being” is not defined, except as an additional attribute of God,”

Again, that is not the definition I gave.

“Sure. But if worlds are created by God, He necessarily exists from the perspective of any of them.”

<font color=”rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)” face=”inherit”>You have a </font>misapprehension<font color=”rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)” face=”inherit”> of what possible worlds are. </font>

<font color=”rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)” face=”inherit”>”</font>This is a reality that science may eventually discover. In the meantime your proof seems to amount to raw speculation.”

No. The proof is valid, so if the premises are true, so is the conclusion. Perhaps by “speculation” you simply mean that one or more of the premises are false, or at least unjustified?

“Not when N remains undefined in any useful terms. It’s just another speculative property.”

N is defined. You haven’t shown what’s wrong with the definition.

There seems to be another misaprehension here: this argument assumes that N has been proven to exist by a sound ontological argument. It is not an attempt to show that N exists but rather an attempt to show that God is identical to N. So it assumes not only that N is a “useful concept” but that N has been shown to exist. As I said before, there are non-theists that believe in the existence of N.

“Technicalities can obscure the fact there is nothing substantial in the argument.”

I guess I just don’t see what you mean. Both the definitions seem unproblematic to me and the logic is valid. Perhaps by “substantial” you mean that the premises are false or unjustified?

“If the goal is to prove God’s existence, there must be more than speculation which may be peculiar to the human mind.”

The goal is to prove that God is identical to the necessary being proved to exist by another argument. I hope that’s clear. We’re skipping a whole other argument in this thread. Perhaps that other argument is bad. You seem to be skeptical of this since you think N is somehow not useful as a concept to begin with. Maybe you’re right, but that is not the point of this argument. Again, it sounds like you have issues with ontological arguments in general, in which case the Gap Problem I’m proposing a solution to doesn’t even arise.

<font color=”rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)” face=”inherit”>”</font>If there were some truth in the arguments you should be able to convince the whole world of God’s existence.”

That strikes me as a complete non sequitur. Why does the argument being sound logically entail that it would convince everyone? After all, an argument being sound and an argument being convincing are two different things.

“Instead when anyone digs into it these prove to be empty.”

I guess I just don’t see that. I think there are many sound arguments for God’s existence.

“Again though I don’t think you have defined “necessary being” in a useful way, instead turning in circles with an additional supposed property of the imagined Deity.”

When you say necessary existence is an “imagined” property, you fail to understand that this argument already assumes a necessary being has been proven. So I think I’m right when I say your issue here is with ontological arguments in general, since you seem to think the very concept of the being they are trying to prove is problematic.

Again, I don’t know what you mean by “useful” here. If you think the concept of a necessary being is contradictory or in some way inconsistent, you haven’t demonstrated this. If you think it’s imaginary in the sense that, though a coherent concept, one hasn’t shown that it actually exists, then, again, this argument is trying to demonstrate this (see above).

“The arguments are like sleight-of-hand, you hide the property of necessary being, than act amazed when it turns up at the behest of the other properties.”

Here you seem to intimate that the argument is invalid in some way, smuggling in the concept of a necessary being. Again, the existence of a necessary being is not in dispute in the argument. The question the argument is attempting to answer is: given that there is a necessary being, is this being identical to God?

” Can you provide some links to non-theists who accept the existence of a necessary being?”

Graham Oppy is a naturalist who believes in the existence of a necessary being. But he holds that this necessary being is the initial state of the universe, not God, showing again that the concept of a necessary being and the concept of God are not the same.

• This reply was modified 12 months ago by  Charles.
• This reply was modified 12 months ago by  Charles.

[Charles]

If you think it’s imaginary in the sense that, though a coherent concept, one hasn’t shown that it actually exists, then, again, this argument is trying to demonstrate this (see above).

Typo: this argument is NOT trying to demonstrate this.

[jayceeii]

What I mean by imagination is that the theologians are saying, “If there were a God, He must have these properties we list.” The theologian is saying, “My mind can naturally apprehend what a Creator-God must be like.” But this might reduce to raw conjecture. As they try to show humility by granting God the three O’s, they might instead look even higher and recognize one from whom universes flow, might not be known so naturally.

[Charles]

So it seems you think we can’t think or talk about God? If so, you haven’t offered an argument for this.

[jayceeii]

These arguments are attempts to assess what attributes are necessary in the Creator. Since you know nothing about the process of creation, or even what creation is, they must fail. For instance to say something is immaterial is not the same as knowing spirit’s properties. As for God’s Personality, you have only your own personality as a measure, such as it is.

I’ve seen another way to counter your idea you have a definition of “necessary being.” The trouble is that “concrete object” is basically a synonym for being, which is defined in no other way or which is certainly used ambiguously, apparently applying to physical elephants, God, and mathematical concepts. The argument thus is a material fallacy of ambiguity in terms. To show the interchangeability, all these sentences are equivalent:

Define a “necessary being” as a concrete object that exists necessarily.

Define a “necessary concrete object” as a being that exists necessarily.

Define a “concrete object existing necessarily” as a “necessary being.”

Define a “being existing necessarily” as a “necessary concrete object.”

[Charles]

“These arguments are attempts to assess what attributes are necessary in the Creator.”

No. It is an argument that God is identical to N.

“Since you know nothing about the process of creation, or even what creation is, they must fail.”

I’m sorry, but you just don’t understand the argument, jayceeii. There is no premise of the argument that has anything to do with creation. If you disagree, please quote which part of the argument references creation or even God as a creator. See also my more formal proofs below and quote where creation is ever referenced.

“The trouble is that “concrete object” is basically a synonym for being,”

No. It is something that can stand in causal relations.

“apparently applying to physical elephants, God, and mathematical concepts”

Jayceeii, mathematical objects are abstract objects, not concrete objects. They’re the exact opposite of concrete objects as they cannot stand in causal relations.

“The argument thus is a material fallacy of ambiguity in terms.”

You give a lot of vague, general statements about the argument without ever referencing it. I defined necessary being and God multiple times. Quote where the ambiguity is in the argument, and please take a look at my more formal proofs below and show me where the “material fallacy” lies.

Again, a necessary being is a concrete object that exists in every possible world. If you don’t like talk of possible worlds then we can formally define a necessary being as follows:

□(∃x)Cx

Where □ is the necessity operator, (∃x) is the existential quantifier, and Cx=’ x is a concrete object’.

No ambiguity, no circularity, and no reference to God. I’m sorry if this seems pedantic, but when you take a deep dive into the logic I’m using in this argument, it doesn’t display the fallacies you allege.

• This reply was modified 12 months ago by  Charles.

[Charles]

BTW: You never answered my question above: do you think we are unable to talk about and think about God, and, if so, what is your argument for this?

[jayceeii]

You misapprehended my response, thinking I was referring to the OP (Original Post). I’ll make another attempt:

These arguments are attempts to assess what attributes are necessary in the Creator. Since you know nothing about the process of creation, or even what creation is, they must fail. For instance to say something is immaterial is not the same as knowing spirit’s properties. As for God’s Personality, you have only your own personality as a measure, such as it is.

[jayceeii]

The initial part of my response had been to answer the question of thinking about God, so we crossed signals there. But we are likely still to cross once you see what I am saying.

You say that “being” and “concrete object” are not ambiguous because “concrete object” is involved in casual relations. This means that to your mind, “being” is not involved in causal relations. In that case I require your definition of “being” too, since to my mind a being would always be involved in causal relations. Furthermore it appears that “material object” is behind your concept of “concrete object,” as you came so readily to elephants as an example. As you try to think of God, it appears to be another “thing,” such as this.

By taking abstract concepts off the table for examples of necessary being you are left with one and only one example for necessary being, which is God, leaving the two concepts basically interchangeable. If you say the state of the universe just after the Big Bang is another candidate, you are left saying there was something immaterial, as you have admitted that what is material or physical is not necessary. Physics would disagree.

Symbols are not an escape from the real world. These are intended as shorthand for real concepts, not as a realm of their own. I’d submit all basic concepts of your argument, necessary being, Aseity and Sovereignty, are from your imagination. Like I said, you are attempting to surmise what a Creator would necessarily have to be according to the measure of the human mind, without seeking knowledge of what the Creator actually is. Specifically you know nothing of God’s essence or powers, that He is not like a creature.

[Charles]

“You say that “being” and “concrete object” are not ambiguous because “concrete object” is involved in casual relations. This means that to your mind, “being” is not involved in causal relations.”

Not at all. Only actually existing things can stand in causal relations. Concrete objects have being, in that they exist, but that is only a necessary condition of a concrete object, not a sufficient condition. If abstract objects exist, they have being int that they have existence, but they’re not concrete objects because they cannot stand in causal relations.

“In that case I require your definition of “being””

I guess I take a being to be something that exists. If by the definition of “being” you mean the definition of “existence”, I take this as a primitive concept without further definition.

“since to my mind a being would always be involved in causal relations.”

I agree. Unless abstract objects exist, only concrete beings exist. If so, then everything that exists can stand in causal relations.

“Furthermore it appears that “material object” is behind your concept of “concrete object””

No, it’s like you just pointed out yourself: a concrete object is anything that can stand in causal relations. This includes angels, God, demons, minds, ect.. So long as it can stand in causal relations, it’s a concrete object.

“As you try to think of God, it appears to be another “thing,” such as this.”

I’m not sure I follow what you mean here. If you mean I also think of God as a concrete object, then that’s right, as God can stand in causal relations, as I think you yourself agree.

“By taking abstract concepts off the table for examples of necessary being you are left with one and only one example for necessary being, which is God, leaving the two concepts basically interchangeable”

Okay, now I see what you mean. First, I did offer God’s thoughts as another example of necessary beings, but let that pass; let’s assume God is the only necessary being. Here, I think you’re confusing sense and reference. Two concepts can refer to the same object while meaning two different things. “The morning star” and “the evening star” both refer to the object Venus, but they have different meanings. My point was that “necessary being” and “God” didn’t mean the same thing, as the definitions show. But obviously I think they both refer to the same thing, since the whole point of the argument was to show that God is identical to N. But that’s the conclusion of the argument; it isn’t presupposed in any of the premises, as I thought you were implying.

“ If you say the state of the universe just after the Big Bang is another candidate, you are left saying there was something immaterial, as you have admitted that what is material or physical is not necessary. “

I’m not following. Graham Oppy holds that the initial state after the Big Bang is a necessary being. I don’t agree with him. I do think all material things are contingent.

“Physics would disagree.”

Do you mean to say that physics hold that the initial state after the Big Bang is a necessary being? Are you saying physics require material things to exist necessarily?

“Symbols are not an escape from the real world. These are intended as shorthand for real concepts, not as a realm of their own.”

I agree.

“Like I said, you are attempting to surmise what a Creator would necessarily have to be”

No. I am arguing that God is identical to N. This is consistent with there being no creator at all. The concept of being a creator plays no part in the argument.

“I’d submit all basic concepts of your argument, necessary being, Aseity and Sovereignty, are from your imagination.”

But that is something you have never argued for, so far as I can see. If the conclusion of the argument is true, then it refers to something in reality. Since you seem to assume it doesn’t, it strikes me that you are begging the question, assuming the conclusion of the argument is false in order to refute the premises of the argument.

“Specifically you know nothing of God’s essence or powers”

That’s just a bare assertion without any evidence.

I don’t know what your take on possible worlds is. Let me try explaining again what I mean because I’m not really sure we disagree about God and necessary being, but I could be wrong:

Take the sum total of reality, everything that exists, including God. Question: could the sum total of reality have been different than it actually is? If yes, then the ways reality could have been different is what I mean by possible worlds.

Using this language, a necessary being would be a concrete object that exists, and would still exist no matter how reality might have been different from what it is. Does that make sense?

The thing I find strange about your view is that you seem to believe God exists and to have a very exalted view of God. But you also seem to hold that the sum total of reality could have been different, and if it had been different in a certain way, God never would have existed. I don’t mean God would have been extinguished, but he never would have existed in the first place. I could be wrong, but intuitively this strikes me as a less exalted view of God. If, on the other hand, you think there is no way reality could have been different such that God never would have existed, if you think God’s existence doesn’t depend on how reality might have been different from what it is, then you agree with me that God is a necessary being.

“These arguments are attempts to assess what attributes are necessary in the Creator. Since you know nothing about the process of creation, or even what creation is, they must fail.”

What do you mean by “these argument”? Are you referring to the argument in my original post? If so, that argument has noting to do with a creator, the process of creation, what creation is, etc. If you mean other arguments besides the argument of this thread, then I fail to see the relevance.

[jayceeii]

JC1: “Without God knowledge, which is to say independent or direct knowledge of what God is and what He is like, both these avenues are mere projections of the imagination, and showing links between them further projections.”

CS: If the above argument is sound, God exists necessarily and is omnipotent, omniscient, etc., etc. That is “something God is like.”

JC2: My point is that your basic hypothesis is the human mind is fit to conjure up a God. You are saying, “If there is a God, we can say what He would be like from pure reason.” Yet a sound philosophy would suggest the Creator may be too magnificent for a creature to begin to comprehend, that a human mind is meant to face only human-sized situations.

JC1: “It’s all conditional. You are saying, “If there’s a being with these properties I imagine, we can make certain statements about it.”

Charles1: I’m sorry, but that is a mischaracterization of the argument.

JC2: Asserting the contrary is not an argument. You say it is mischaracterized but fail to say how, leading a perspicacious reader to conclude you don’t know or can’t say how. It is amazing to notice theology can be reduced to human attempts to invent God from using what is in their own minds as a pattern, the reality totally unknown and unexplored.

JC1: “It takes you no closer to knowing if there is such a being in reality.”

CS: The reasoning logically entails that such a being exists in reality. Take a careful look at the argument.

JC2: We have major evidence that it does not, in that only theologians are convinced. It has not moved the world even a little. I have shown the argument can be turned inside out, that it is really a convoluted form of listing imagined attributes of God in parallel, one of which is “necessary being.” “If our imagined God has this attribute and that attribute, then it would relate in the following way with this other attribute, necessary being.”

JC1: “Hence theological arguments never sway the masses. They are basically groundless.”

CS: This is a non sequitur.

JC2: This too is a groundless assertion. Pointing a finger does not amount to an argument. Where are your grounds for saying it is a non sequitur? Where are your grounds for saying there is necessary existence apart from God? Where are your grounds for saying the attributes for a putative God which theologians can imagine, point to an actual God?

JC1: My issue was that you were trying to make something from this definition, to imply it gave you information about a real God.”

CS: You said the issue was that it was circular. It’s not circular.

JC2: Asserting the opposite is a common tactic of yours. Don’t you see you need to support counterassertions? If it is circular there is no new information generated, no meaningful predicate, almost a tautology, “God is a necessary being” and “Necessary being is an attribute God.”

CS: The notion of Aseity as well as Sovereignty are the two notions that are doing the work in the argument, but I don’t see how that is a problem, so long as the conclusion follows. The only way to fault the argument is to show that these notions are somehow inconsistent or that the conclusion doesn’t follow from them.

JC2: The problem is that both Aseity and Sovereignty are defined as “implied of an N being,” hence my charge that “necessary being” amounts to a further attribute of the imagined Deity, the argument merely the interplay between unsupported definitions. There is also a fallacy of failing to define one’s terms, and that’s the fallacy at play here.

JC1: “You are basically saying that God would have to be N because you have defined Him that way,”

CS: No. I never defined God as a necessary being.

JC2: You have not defined necessary being at all, except to conclude God must be one. For instance to say what exists in all possible worlds is a necessary being is meaningless when you don’t know what it takes to make a world. The Big Bang theorists bypass this one easily, to say that in any Big Bang world there is no necessary being, only accidental being.

JC1: “which is to say with Aseity and Sovereignty that negate the possibility of an N separate from God.”

CS: If you mean that N cannot be separate from given the definitions and premises of the argument, that’s right. That’s the whole point of the argument to show that. So long as the argument is valid, I don’t see a problem.

JC2: The problem is that all of these ideas are made up or imagined, from Aseity, to Sovereignty, to necessary being. You are defining them through imagination only. This is why theology has had no impact on the world, you have no solid grounds for assertion.

JC1: “But in all this N remains practically undefined except as an alternative term for God.”

CS: No. Again, I am not using N and God interchangeably. I also gave a definition of N in the beginning of the argument, so it’s not undefined.

JC2: Please restate it clearly and in non-circular format, with a predicate that is different from its subject. This would have been a handy place to restate it, in the context of the argument rather than my having to ask for it, as you know I have not accepted these. If you have this, by all means let us see it. As I said, if it is solid you’d have a new religion.

JC1: “You aren’t demonstrating there is some Being with Aseity and Sovereignty, instead showing you have the imagination to think about these concepts.”

CS: No, the argument shows that such a being exists necessarily.

JC2: If it did you’d have a new religion, and you wouldn’t even need the Living God. Instead theology has always been impotent in the world, unable to get traction in reality.

JC1: “We’re talking about metaphysics, where human imagination might not really apply. There is a classical conception about God, but it might tell us only about the human mind.”

CS: So long as the definition isn’t logically or metaphysically inconsistent, there’s no problem. Perhaps your worry is that you suspect that the definition is metaphysically inconsistent in some way?

JC2: If the terms are defined from imagination instead of God knowledge it is a problem. And this is what you seem to be doing, looking for inconsistencies between imagined ideas. Trying to think of God as great, you should also think of Him beyond human ideas. The notions of Sovereignty and Aseity might make Him laugh, if you’ve missed the truth.

JC1: “What I’m really after is a meaningful definition for “necessary being,” that doesn’t amount to a subtle restatement of a possibly imaginary God-concept.”

CS: I gave a definition of necessary being that doesn’t involve God. Again, the two terms are not interchangeable.

JC2: You seem to be convinced you have, but you should know I have not agreed so a restatement was in order to keep the conversation flowing. So restate it now, if you can.

JC1: “The arguments appear to be attempts to look straight at God without reference to revelations about Him.”

Charles: I don’t know what you mean “look straight at God.” Nobody can do that in this life. The argument defines God, and it seems your worry (correct me if I’m wrong) is that we can’t really do this with our human minds. Am I right?

JC2: By “looking straight at God” I mean theologians are postulating about God’s attributes from the notions of a human mind of what a Deity would be like if He exists. The arguments you supplied do not rely on scriptures, but are a more direct theology. You almost show humility here, but have not the humility to admit your guesses about God may be wrong, for instance about Aseity and Sovereignty, as well as necessary being except in the two definitions I have allowed. The big error, perhaps, is cold omnipotence.

JC1: “Yes, but “necessary being” is not defined, except as an additional attribute of God,”

CS: Again, that is not the definition I gave.

JC2: You’re under a presumption you have given a definition, though I haven’t seen one. For instance to say what must exist in all possible worlds is necessary, adds no information when you don’t know what it takes to make a world, or even have any idea.

JC1: “Sure. But if worlds are created by God, He necessarily exists from the perspective of any of them.”

CS: You have a misapprehension of what possible worlds are.

JC2: I think the concept is highly misleading since it seems to lend the human mind an ability to think of multiple worlds when there’s no serious ideation about even one world.

JC1: “This is a reality that science may eventually discover. In the meantime your proof seems to amount to raw speculation.”

CS: No. The proof is valid, so if the premises are true, so is the conclusion. Perhaps by “speculation” you simply mean that one or more of the premises are false, or at least unjustified?

JC2: Undefined. And this is why the public is not responding to theology. The terms are defined privately, and you can’t make them relevant to the public. You likely presume the public must be slow-witted compared to yourself, but a quick wit should make it reachable and thus there’s also a possibility that the terms are unreal, pointing at nothing.

JC1: “Not when N remains undefined in any useful terms. It’s just another speculative property.”

CS: N is defined. You haven’t shown what’s wrong with the definition.

JC2: I did but you didn’t accept it. And I’m not even sure what you are referring to here, since the argument has gone on some time and you tried several avenues that I rejected.

CS: There seems to be another misaprehension here: this argument assumes that N has been proven to exist by a sound ontological argument. It is not an attempt to show that N exists but rather an attempt to show that God is identical to N. So it assumes not only that N is a “useful concept” but that N has been shown to exist. As I said before, there are non-theists that believe in the existence of N.

JC2: Your mind appears to hold unclarity, for you are insisting that you can of yourself give a definition of necessary existence, but also appeal to non-theists who think so too. If your argument were strong you wouldn’t need this additional appeal, but as it stands this is the sole chance your arguments hold weight. Otherwise the OP is foundationless.

JC1: “Technicalities can obscure the fact there is nothing substantial in the argument.”

CS: I guess I just don’t see what you mean. Both the definitions seem unproblematic to me and the logic is valid. Perhaps by “substantial” you mean that the premises are false or unjustified?

JC2: There is a difference between what is complex and what is true, and complexity can seem like truth until it is examined carefully. Another term for this is obfuscation, that people wanting to defend their thoughts as meaningful can add many layers of obscurity to bury the fact they really don’t know and may perhaps not even care that much to know.

JC1: “If the goal is to prove God’s existence, there must be more than speculation which may be peculiar to the human mind.”

CS: The goal is to prove that God is identical to the necessary being proved to exist by another argument. I hope that’s clear. We’re skipping a whole other argument in this thread. Perhaps that other argument is bad. You seem to be skeptical of this since you think N is somehow not useful as a concept to begin with. Maybe you’re right, but that is not the point of this argument. Again, it sounds like you have issues with ontological arguments in general, in which case the Gap Problem I’m proposing a solution to doesn’t even arise.

JC2: My initial reply was posted in this light, but we’ve turned to challenge the initial steps, which you’d have to admit are vital if the secondary steps are to be meaningful. You want to say necessary being is well established, I say if it were it is a new religion.

JC1: If there were some truth in the arguments you should be able to convince the whole world of God’s existence.”

CS: That strikes me as a complete non sequitur. Why does the argument being sound logically entail that it would convince everyone? After all, an argument being sound and an argument being convincing are two different things.

JC2: This is because if you can establish there is such a thing as necessary being, you will disprove the Big Bang theorists. In essence you will have proved the First Cause, that there is something that necessarily exists though everything physical is not necessary. Instead theology has been pointing weakly at God and necessary being by imagination.

To me it is weird you don’t think of logic as convincing. That’s how it should always be. But you can raise questions of why a logical argument isn’t convincing even if it is true.

JC1: “Instead when anyone digs into it these prove to be empty.”

CS: I guess I just don’t see that. I think there are many sound arguments for God’s existence.

JC2: It’s always about the premises, isn’t it? Logical form is easy, definition is difficult.

JC1: “Again though I don’t think you have defined “necessary being” in a useful way, instead turning in circles with an additional supposed property of the imagined Deity.”

CS: When you say necessary existence is an “imagined” property, you fail to understand that this argument already assumes a necessary being has been proven. So I think I’m right when I say your issue here is with ontological arguments in general, since you seem to think the very concept of the being they are trying to prove is problematic.

JC2: And I can ask you in turn how you can be satisfied with secondary arguments when the primary are unsatisfactory. It’s like manufacturing the tops of shoes, neglecting soles.

CS: Again, I don’t know what you mean by “useful” here. If you think the concept of a necessary being is contradictory or in some way inconsistent, you haven’t demonstrated this. If you think it’s imaginary in the sense that, though a coherent concept, one hasn’t shown that it actually exists, then, again, this argument is trying to demonstrate this (see above).

JC2: It looks to me like the concept of necessary being is empty, except as a putative attribute of God. I am not sure the concept is coherent outside of that context, either.

JC1: “The arguments are like sleight-of-hand, you hide the property of necessary being, than act amazed when it turns up at the behest of the other properties.”

CS: Here you seem to intimate that the argument is invalid in some way, smuggling in the concept of a necessary being. Again, the existence of a necessary being is not in dispute in the argument. The question the argument is attempting to answer is: given that there is a necessary being, is this being identical to God?

“In such a world, God would either be identical to N or be the ontological ground for N’s existence, since, if he isn’t either, he wouldn’t be the only self existing being (Aseity) nor be sovereign over N’s existence (Sovereignty).”

JC2: Aseity and Sovereignty are defined as attributes of God which reign over N. But N is only defined as another attribute of God (insofar as any definitions you’ve presented). The argument merely paces about through definitions that are generated by imagination.

JC1: “Can you provide some links to non-theists who accept the existence of a necessary being?”

CS: Graham Oppy is a naturalist who believes in the existence of a necessary being. But he holds that this necessary being is the initial state of the universe, not God, showing again that the concept of a necessary being and the concept of God are not the same.

JC2: Here is where I really need some links for you or a brief summation of his ideas, since a Google search only revealed hours-long videos my life circumstances do not allow time for me to watch. What I was able to glean from searching is that he does not seem fundamentally different in his reasoning from theologians, that is to say, he doesn’t have a solid definition. How does Oppy face off against the Big Bang theorists? He surely does not have opposing science, instead limited to possibly impotent imagination.

[Charles]

“ Asserting the contrary is not an argument. You say it is mischaracterized but fail to say how, leading a perspicacious reader to conclude you don’t know or can’t say how.”

To quote you, you stated: “ It’s all conditional. You are saying, “If there’s a being with these properties I imagine, we can make certain statements about it.”

That is not a fair representation of the argument. That isn’t even an argument at all. So I think this is clearly a misrepresentation.

If you can quote where in my argument your above quoted statement is made or implied, I’ll reconsider.

“ We have major evidence that it does not, in that only theologians are convinced”

Again, an argument can be sound even if not everyone is convinced of the conclusion. The argument entails the conclusion logically; that was my point. To fault the argument, you need to point out which premise is false and why.

“ I have shown the argument can be turned inside out, that it is really a convoluted form of listing imagined attributes of God in parallel, one of which is “necessary being.” “

Your criticisms are very vague and hard to understand. For instance, how does premise (1) of the argument list an attribute?

Do you think the argument is valid in the sense that if both premises are true, the conclusion would also be true? If not, what illicit logical inference is committed?

If you think the conclusion follows but one or more of the premises is false, which premise is false and why?

It would be more helpful to this discussion if you engaged with the premises and the logic of the argument instead of making vague general statements about it.

““If our imagined God has this attribute and that attribute, then it would relate in the following way with this other attribute, necessary being.”

N in premise (1) is not an attribute: it’s a being. The conclusion of the argument is that God is identical to this being. So your language seems to be a mischaracterization, seeming to vaguely imply that attribute shifting is all that is going on when this isn’t happening in either of the premises of the argument.

Again, it would be more helpful if you would clearly state either where there is a misstep in a logical inference of the argument, or point out which premise is false and why.

“Where are your grounds for saying it is a non sequitur? “

The fact that “theological arguments never sway the masses” in no way logically entails “They are basically groundles.”

“ Where are your grounds for saying there is necessary existence apart from God? “

First, the argument doesn’t need to be able to demonstrate that there are other necessary beings to be successful. Second, I gave the case of God’s thoughts and abstract objects. You deny abstract objects, but you haven’t given an argument for this conclusion, and I pointed out that logicians can prove that mathematical and logical statements are necessarily true. You state that God’s thoughts are a part of God, but this doesn’t mean they aren’t necessary beings. By my definition, a necessary being is a concrete object that exists necessarily. Thoughts are concrete objects and if God exists necessarily, so do his thoughts.

“Where are your grounds for saying the attributes for a putative God which theologians can imagine, point to an actual God?”

The argument of this thread. That’s the whole point.

“Asserting the opposite is a common tactic of yours. Don’t you see you need to support counterassertions?”

I did. Let me repeat: stating something in a more technical way is not circular; it’s just stating something in a more technical way. Show me how stating something in a more technical way is circular.

““God is a necessary being” and “Necessary being is an attribute of God.”

Which premise of the argument states that God is a necessary being? Which premise states that necessary being is an attribute of God?

“The problem is that both Aseity and Sovereignty are defined as “implied of an N being,”

Where in the argument is such an assertion made? Can you please quote the part of the argument that states this?

“There is also a fallacy of failing to define one’s terms, and that’s the fallacy at play here.”

Not defining terms is not a fallacy. Both God and necessary being are defined.

“You have not defined necessary being at all, except to conclude God must be one.”

Here is a quote from my third post:

“I mean by “necessary being” a concrete object (something that can stand in causal relations) that exists necessarily.”

I then repeated this definition several times in my following posts. So I did define the term. Yes, the conclusion of the argument is that God is identical to N. That is the conclusion of the argument; it is not in any of the premises of the argument.

“For instance to say what exists in all possible worlds is a necessary being is meaningless when you don’t know what it takes to make a world.”

I am using the term “possible world” the same way modal logicians use it. I’ve asked you several times if you’re familiar with this definition.

“The problem is that all of these ideas are made up or imagined, from Aseity, to Sovereignty, to necessary being.”

So are you saying that these attributes are incoherent? If so, how?

Do you mean the attributes don’t apply to anything in reality? If so, what is your argument for this?

So long as God, so defined, possibly exists the argument goes through. Are you saying that God, so defined, is impossible, and if so, why?

“This would have been a handy place to restate it, in the context of the argument rather than my having to ask for it”

No offense, but it seems to me you’re not reading my argument as I did state it clearly. Here is a quotation of my fourth thread:

“Here’s perhaps a better way of putting the argument:

Define a “necessary being” as a concrete object that exists necessarily.

Define “God” as an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being who also has the further properties of Aseity and Sovereignty.

1. A necessary being, N, exists.

2. Possibly, God exists.

Now consider a possible world, W, where God and N exist. Assume God is not identical to N in W. Then God would not be the only self-existent being in W, and so lack Aseity. Nor would God be sovereign over N’s existence in W and so lack Sovereignty. Contradiction! So God is identical to N in W. But then God is identical to N in every possible world, and so:

3. God is identical to N.”

As you can see, defining necessary being is the very first thing I did. This is why I asked you to take another look at the argument.

“If it did you’d have a new religion, and you wouldn’t even need the Living God.”

This is vague. You’ll need to elaborate.

“If the terms are defined from imagination instead of God knowledge it is a problem.”

What do you mean by “God knowledge” and what is your argument that only concepts defined by God knowledge are valid?

“Trying to think of God as great, you should also think of Him beyond human ideas. The notions of Sovereignty and Aseity might make Him laugh, if you’ve missed the truth.”

I think I understand now where you’re coming from: you think our language cannot reference God. God is so wholly transcendent that he is beyond all human thought. Am I right? If so, what is your argument for this?

“The arguments you supplied do not rely on scriptures,”

It doesn’t need to rely on scriptures to be sound.

“You almost show humility here, but have not the humility to admit your guesses about God may be wrong,”

Where did I ever state or imply that my view about God couldn’t possibly be wrong? Can you provide a direct quote?

“ For instance to say what must exist in all possible worlds is necessary, adds no information when you don’t know what it takes to make a world, or even have any idea.”

I ask you again if you’re familiar with the definition of “possible world” employed by modal logicians.

“ I think the concept is highly misleading since it seems to lend the human mind an ability to think of multiple worlds when there’s no serious ideation about even one world.”

What is your argument that no one can think about even one world?

“Perhaps by “speculation” you simply mean that one or more of the premises are false, or at least unjustified?

JC2: Undefined.”

Which part? I defined both God and necessary being.

“The terms are defined privately, and you can’t make them relevant to the public.”

The attributes are defined publicly in that many books and articles are published about them. They’re difficult and technical, but that’s analytic philosophy in a nutshell.

I don’t know what you mean by making these attributes “relevant to the public.” I’m concerned about truth, not what the public is likely to accept.

“You likely presume the public must be slow-witted compared to yourself,”

There’s no reason to be insulting. I don’t think this at all. I’m just trying to find the truth as best I can.

“ but a quick wit should make it reachable and thus there’s also a possibility that the terms are unreal, pointing at nothing”

I’m sorry, but this sentence is very difficult to understand. Could you elaborate?

“You haven’t shown what’s wrong with the definition.

JC2: I did but you didn’t accept it.”

Could you repeat it here? Please try to be more direct: is it incoherent, and if so, why?

“ Your mind appears to hold unclarity, for you are insisting that you can of yourself give a definition of necessary existence”

Yes. I gave a definition. Are you implying that giving a definition of necessary existence is impossible? If so, what is your argument for that?

“but also appeal to non-theists who think so too. If your argument were strong you wouldn’t need this additional appeal,”

The appeal had nothing to do with the argument. I was explaining the Gap Problem, not trying to bolster the argument.

“ but as it stands this is the sole chance your arguments hold weight.”

I’m sorry, are you claiming that, for the argument to work, it needs to be shown that non-theists believe in a necessary being? That is no part of the argument.

“ Otherwise the OP is foundationless.”

What do you mean by “OP”?

“There is a difference between what is complex and what is true, and complexity can seem like truth until it is examined carefully.”

Granted, but to examine the complexity of this argument thoroughly would involve diving into quantified modal logic. There just is no other way to examine the complexities involved.

“Another term for this is obfuscation, that people wanting to defend their thoughts as meaningful can add many layers of obscurity to bury the fact they really don’t know and may perhaps not even care that much to know.”

There’s no reason for ad hominem attacks. I’m sorry if you think I don’t care to know the truth and am only trying to hide behind technicalities. The truth is this is a very technical argument that utilizes quantified modal logic. You asked for definitions within this field that would be hard to convey if you’re not familiar with the field.

“My initial reply was posted in this light, but we’ve turned to challenge the initial steps, which you’d have to admit are vital if the secondary steps are to be meaningful.”

But this misses the mark, as the argument doesn’t give the initial step. This thread isn’t about an ontological argument; it’s about the Gap Problem.

“This is because if you can establish there is such a thing as necessary being, you will disprove the Big Bang theorists.”

How?

“ In essence you will have proved the First Cause,”

No. Again, this is not a first cause argument.

“ that there is something that necessarily exists though everything physical is not necessary.”

I don’t think the physical universe is necessary, and neither do most big bang theorist, since they believe the universe began to exist. I still don’t see what this has to do with my argument.

“ Instead theology has been pointing weakly at God and necessary being by imagination.”

Again, if your contention is that human language cannot talk about God or God cannot be thought about, you need to provide an argument for this.

“To me it is weird you don’t think of logic as convincing. That’s how it should always be.”

Something being convincing has to do with psychology; something being sound has to do with logic and truth. They’re two different things.

“ But you can raise questions of why a logical argument isn’t convincing even if it is true.”

Exactly. Because an argument being sound and an argument being convincing are two different things; one doesn’t entail the other.

“ It’s always about the premises, isn’t it? Logical form is easy, definition is difficult.”

I agree. And so there are going to be sound arguments that are disputed because not everyone will agree that the premises are true.

“And I can ask you in turn how you can be satisfied with secondary arguments when the primary are unsatisfactory.”

I’m not convinced they are unsatisfactory. I wanted to propose a solution to the Gap Problem, not give an ontological argument. If you don’t think a necessary being exists, the Gap Problem isn’t a problem for you. But as I said, there are many non-theists who believe a necessary being exists. For these philosophers, my argument may have force.

“It looks to me like the concept of necessary being is empty, except as a putative attribute of God. “

So do you mean the concept is coherent but doesn’t refer to anything? If so, what is your argument for this?

“ Aseity and Sovereignty are defined as attributes of God which reign over N.”

I don’t know what you mean by “reign over N”.

“But N is only defined as another attribute of God”

No. It’s not an attribute; it’s a concrete object that necessarily exists.

“The argument merely paces about through definitions that are generated by imagination.”

If by “imagination” you mean they don’t refer to anything, you haven’t demonstrated this.

“ Here is where I really need some links for you or a brief summation of his ideas, since a Google search only revealed hours-long videos my life circumstances do not allow time for me to watch. “

I don’t have such links. I learned about his ideas via those long videos you mention.

A brief summation would be that he believes the initial state of the universe after the Big Bang (if there was a Big Bang; he’s unsure) is a necessary being. It’s a concrete object and he believes it exists in every possible world.

“what I was able to glean from searching is that he does not seem fundamentally different in his reasoning from theologians, that is to say, he doesn’t have a solid definition.”

I guess I still don’t see what is wrong with the definition of a concrete object that exists in every possible world. Your statements against possible worlds evince that you are using the concept differently than philosophers and logicians. So I don’t think you’ve successfully shown what is wrong with the definition.

“How does Oppy face off against the Big Bang theorists?”

He tentatively accepts the Big Bang, though he would say he really doesn’t know for sure. The initial state of the universe at time t=0, he would say, is a necessary being, even if it began to exist.

[jayceeii]

Is this identical to the “first cause”? That without this cause, there are no causal chains? Or do you make a distinction between first cause and necessary being? Without carefully defining “necessary being” arguments based on this don’t have much pull upon society.

[Charles]

This isn’t a first cause argument. A necessary being doesn’t have to be a first cause.

[jayceeii]

Can you put the distinction into words? When you defined the necessary being as something that can stand in causal relations this seemed to imply the First Cause arguments such as from Aquinas. To my way of thinking the creation can call God a “necessary being” for itself; that is, without God there would be no creation, even to speculate. And you can separate it from First Cause, if God must continue adding causes to creation to sustain it. But I don’t see a way to approach the concept of a necessary being without reference to the Creator/creation dichotomy, which the atheists dispute.

[Charles]

A concrete object is an object that can stand in causal relations. A chair, elephant, planet, etc. are all concrete objects. A necessary being would be a concrete object that necessarily exists. So long as it’s a concrete object and exists necessarily, it would be a necessary being, whether or not it’s the cause of the universe.

• This reply was modified 12 months ago by  Charles.

[jayceeii]

Hmm. I’m still not getting the meaning of “necessary being.” You seem to have only said that a necessary being is one that necessarily exists, and I don’t understand what it means to necessarily exist. I’d agree that an elephant is not a necessary being. For instance we know it will die, so it only exists temporarily, and if it has a soul and there is a God, He could wipe that out too if He wanted. God could not be wiped out by any aspect of His creation, so this would be a second way I would interpret “necessary being,” along with being necessary for creation as Creator. But atheists would object this is all hypothetical.

[Charles]

To exist necessarily is to exist in every possible world. More formally, x exists necessarily if the sentence “x exists” is necessarily true. Are you familiar with modal logic and first order quantified logic?

I agree an elephant doesn’t exist necessarily. I was using an elephant as an example of a concrete object, not a necessary being.

• This reply was modified 12 months ago by  Charles.

[jayceeii]

Maybe I’m not getting something, but “to exist in every possible world” still looks like something I could only interpret as, “If God creates worlds, no world can exist without God’s presence being necessary.” You’re missing a quintessential definition, what necessary being is in itself. And I interpret “every possible world” in terms of future worlds God will create. I don’t imagine an alternative universe. That’s too much fiction.

How can modal logic or first order quantified logic help here? “x exists necessarily if the sentence ‘x exists’ is necessarily true” still looks circular to me. You haven’t said what necessary existence is, instead just repeated this term “necessary” with some unusual meaning that remains undefined. Whatever you’d say about a thing is invalid if you don’t know what that thing is. Can you think of some necessary being, apart from God? If you can’t, aren’t you just using the terms interchangeably, and not adding useful predicates?

[Charles]

“Maybe I’m not getting something, but “to exist in every possible world” still looks like something I could only interpret as, “If God creates worlds, no world can exist without God’s presence being necessary.” “

No. A world where God creates nothing is still a possible world. Are you familiar with Plantinga’s definition of a possible world?

Also, necessity and possibility are defined in modal logic, but if you’re unfamiliar with the field, the technical definitions may not be helpful, and we may be better off sticking to possible world semantics.

““x exists necessarily if the sentence ‘x exists’ is necessarily true” still looks circular to me.”

It’s not circular; it’s saying the same thing in a slightly more technical way. An existential sentence is a sentence stating that something exists. To say x necessarily exists means that the existential sentence stating its existence (e.g. “x exists”) is a necessarily true sentence.

Using possible world semantics, we can say that x necessarily exists if it exists in every possible world.

“Can you think of some necessary being, apart from God?”

God’s thoughts may also count as necessary beings in the sense I’m using it. If we’re talking about abstract objects as well as concrete objects, many philosophers believe that mathematical objects such as numbers and sets exist necessarily.

• This reply was modified 12 months ago by  Charles.
• This reply was modified 12 months ago by  Charles.

[jayceeii]

A world where God created nothing would not be a world. There would thus be no one and nothing there to define Him as a necessary being. I’d accept a time before creation. Then once creation appears, it can define God as necessary. But it holds no meaning otherwise. If it did, you could form a religion and you wouldn’t even need God for it!

God’s thoughts would have to be counted as “part of God,” so it isn’t answering the query to think of some necessary being, apart from God. This is something of the point, though, if “necessary being” and “God” are being used interchangeably, the arguments are circular and present no new or useful information. You are pointing in two imaginary directions, defining both “God” and “necessary being” by raw and interchangeable ideas.

Saying something a different way is still circular when there is still no useful predicate.

You bring up the subject of mathematical objects, but I’d argue these are mental constructs and thus do not have existence on their own. There is no set unless someone is there to note the similarities and thus form a mental category. There are no numbers unless there is someone there to count. After seeing there is one thing, we next notice that there are two things. Two is one more than one. But if two asteroids collide and there is no one there to observe, these are descriptionless events occurring in atomic matter. We can say there are two asteroids, but the asteroids and the space around them do not count.

To see this more clearly imagine a more complex scenario, such as an atomic explosion. Here although overall math estimating the energies can be constructed, any math attempting to account for the motions and energy changes of every single atom is doomed to fail. The events still occur but it is more obvious that these must remain descriptionless, which is the same case for only two things when no one is there to count.

[Charles]

“A world where God created nothing would not be a world.”

How are you defining possible world? Universe? Are you familiar with the definition of possible world in the literature? By that definition a world in which God exists alone is a possible world.

“There would thus be no one and nothing there to define Him as a necessary being.”

God wouldn’t need a creature to define him as a necessary being in order to be a necessary being.

“I’d accept a time before creation. Then once creation appears, it can define God as necessary.”

Definitions have to do with language, so I don’t see how a creation could define God as necessary.

“But it holds no meaning otherwise.”

I don’t know what you mean by this. God would be God even if no one existed to define him. He would exist, even if no creature existed to define existence. Reality doesn’t need creatures to define it in order to be real.

“God’s thoughts would have to be counted as “part of God,” so it isn’t answering the query to think of some necessary being, apart from God.”

Thoughts are concrete objects, even if they are part of God. And if God exists necessarily, his thoughts would exist necessarily as well. Hence, they would be concrete objects that exist necessarily, which is the definition of necessary being.

“This is something of the point, though, if “necessary being” and “God” are being used interchangeably”

No. God and necessary being are not being used interchangeably.

“Saying something a different way is still circular when there is still no useful predicate.”

Saying the same thing in a more technical way is not circular. What do you mean by “useful predicate”?

“You bring up the subject of mathematical objects, but I’d argue these are mental constructs and thus do not have existence on their own. “

You may be right. Still, many philosophers accept their existence, so necessary existence isn’t reserved only for God.

One can actually prove that mathematical truths are necessarily true, and thus true in every possible world. One can also prove that logical truths, like the law of non-contradiction, are necessarily true. This means both are true in possible worlds where no human beings exist. I don’t know how to explain this fact.

[jayceeii]

JC1: “A world where God created nothing would not be a world.”

Charles: How are you defining possible world? Universe? Are you familiar with the definition of possible world in the literature? By that definition a world in which God exists alone is a possible world.

JC2: I define a possible world as one which God could possibly make. Not an imaginary world, but a real one with a biosphere. When God exists alone, He has yet to make a world. This is relevant. God also hovers over worlds for billions of years alone, to make a biosphere.

JC1: “There would thus be no one and nothing there to define Him as a necessary being.”

Charles: God wouldn’t need a creature to define him as a necessary being in order to be a necessary being.

JC2: God finds Himself to be a necessary being before creation, which is to say according to my second definition as a non-extinguishable being. But you are a creature and we’re talking about how God is necessary from your perspective. You are the one trying to define “necessary,” and without God you wouldn’t be here so He is necessary both to originate and to sustain. It’s interesting how your mind seems to think it could be with God to consider His aloneness, but that is an unreal consideration. God’s thoughts are not in parallel with yours either, either existentially or otherwise. You can’t trace from your thoughts to what God is thinking. If you think you can you aren’t perceiving or considering the grandeur of the Creator, that is not like His creatures.

JC1: “I’d accept a time before creation. Then once creation appears, it can define God as necessary.”

Charles: Definitions have to do with language, so I don’t see how a creation could define God as necessary.

JC2: You are a creature, a part of creation, so God is necessary for your existence and that of your situation, even if you don’t know or define it linguistically. It’s a matter of scientific observation. I guess I’m using the word “define” in a larger sense of causation.

JC1: “But it holds no meaning otherwise.”

Charles: I don’t know what you mean by this. God would be God even if no one existed to define him. He would exist, even if no creature existed to define existence. Reality doesn’t need creatures to define it in order to be real.

JC2: To be defined as Creator, there must be a creation. My point is you have not defined “necessary being” in a meaningful way, as opposed to the two senses I have indicated. You are only listing “necessary being” as an additional attribute of an imagined Deity.

JC1:“God’s thoughts would have to be counted as “part of God,” so it isn’t answering the query to think of some necessary being, apart from God.”

Charles: Thoughts are concrete objects, even if they are part of God. And if God exists necessarily, his thoughts would exist necessarily as well. Hence, they would be concrete objects that exist necessarily, which is the definition of necessary being.

JC2: No, you don’t have any idea what God’s thoughts are like. The attributes you are assigning to Him like omnipotence seem grand, but you are failing in practical greatness. A creature cannot use himself as a model for what God is like, in thought or anything else. So part of your description of the awesome one who made you, must be inscrutability from the creaturely plane. Otherwise your “omnipotence” lacks meaning.

I’d repeat the criticism, that speaking of God’s thoughts as occurring in God Himself (if you can grow to admit the thoughts are not like your thoughts), adds nothing to the definition of “necessary being,” which you appear to use interchangeably with “God.”

JC1: “This is something of the point, though, if “necessary being” and “God” are being used interchangeably”

Charles: No. God and necessary being are not being used interchangeably.

JC2: Asserting the contrary is not an argument. You have yet to generate one useful predicate as definition for “necessary being.”

JC1: “Saying something a different way is still circular when there is still no useful predicate.”

Charles: Saying the same thing in a more technical way is not circular. What do you mean by “useful predicate”?

JC2: “Necessary being” is a… what? Definitions have subjects and predicates, but you have only subjects, “God” and “necessary being.” Define “necessary being” apart from God.

JC1: “You bring up the subject of mathematical objects, but I’d argue these are mental constructs and thus do not have existence on their own. “

Charles: You may be right. Still, many philosophers accept their existence, so necessary existence isn’t reserved only for God.

JC2: At least here there is an attempt for a useful predicate. If many philosophers accept their existence, necessary existence isn’t reserved only for God for these philosophers. It’s an ad populum argument as you present it, until you look carefully at what they say.

Charles: One can actually prove that mathematical truths are necessarily true, and thus true in every possible world. One can also prove that logical truths, like the law of non-contradiction, are necessarily true. This means both are true in possible worlds where no human beings exist. I don’t know how to explain this fact.

JC2: Here the argument may be interesting and worthy of a new discussion. The question is whether any of these truths exists of itself, or if minds are required before the truth exists. Reality quickly overwhelms any possible thought structures particularly down at the quantum level, and this fact shows the concepts arising around simple cases are indeed just thought structures and not inherent to existence or reality. But this requires the detachment to see reality without thought overlays, which is difficult for attached minds to achieve. Reality exists and then minds encounter it. Order can be found in it but does not fundamentally inhere. To put it another way, the ordered structures are always limited. Truth is reality’s description, but reality always evades truth.

In any case, before God creates there is no substance in which any mathematical truth could apply. Therefore in your admitted case where God does not create, where is math?

[Charles]

“ I define a possible world as one which God could possibly make.”

That is not how I or philosophers are using the term, so we’re talking past each other.

A possible world is a way reality might be. To reference William Lane Craig (Reasonable Faith, pg 183), we can think of possible worlds as a huge conjunction, p & q & r & s… whose individual conjuncts are propositions p,q,r,s… A possible world would then be a conjunction which comprises every proposition or its contradictory, so that it yields a maximal description of reality.By then negating certain conjuncts, we arrive at different possible worlds:

W1: p & q & r & s…

W2: p & ~q & r & ~ s…

W3: ~p & ~q & r & s…

…

“Not an imaginary world, but a real one with a biosphere.”

Again, to quote Craig (ibid): “by a ‘possible world’ one does not mean a planet or even a universe”

“God finds Himself to be a necessary being before creation, which is to say according to my second definition as a non-extinguishable being. “

I also hold to this definition.

“But you are a creature and we’re talking about how God is necessary from your perspective.”

No, we’re talking about God existing in every possible world (as defined above). Something true of him regardless of if any creature exists or not.

“You are the one trying to define “necessary,” and without God you wouldn’t be here so He is necessary both to originate and to sustain. “

You are using “necessary” in an equivocal way. God is causally necessary for my existence, but this is a different sense of “necessity” than the one employed in the argument.

“ It’s interesting how your mind seems to think it could be with God to consider His aloneness”

I don’t know what you mean by my mind “being with God”. Are you saying it’s literally impossible to imagine God existing alone? If so, what is your argument for this?

“God’s thoughts are not in parallel with yours either, either existentially or otherwise.”

God’s thoughts are above my thoughts, true. But I don’t see how it follows that I can’t think about God or speak about God.

“You can’t trace from your thoughts to what God is thinking.”

You mean I can’t know what God is thinking? I’m not sure that’s true. I’m open to logic and mathematics being a revelation of the thoughts of God. But even if I can’t think God’s thoughts, I don’t see what relevance that has to my argument.

“ I guess I’m using the word “define” in a larger sense of causation.”

I see. God creates and so he is defined as a creator via his creation. But I don’t see how this applies to God being a necessary being. God doesn’t have to create a universe in order to exist in every possible world.

“My point is you have not defined “necessary being” in a meaningful way, as opposed to the two senses I have indicated.”

A necessary being is a concrete object that exists in every possible world, where “possible world” is defined as above. I don’t see how this is a problematic definition.

“You are only listing “necessary being” as an additional attribute of an imagined Deity.”

No, it’s not an attribute; its a concrete object that exists in every possible world. A necessary being is a thing, it’s not a property.

“No, you don’t have any idea what God’s thoughts are like.”

I disagree. God’s thoughts stand in causal relations. God’s thoughts are immaterial. God’s thoughts are grounded in his nature. God’s thoughts are beyond our thoughts. These are all truths about God’s thoughts.

“ A creature cannot use himself as a model for what God is like, in thought or anything else.”

What is your argument for this?

“ So part of your description of the awesome one who made you, must be inscrutability from the creaturely plane. “

If you mean that I think and talk about God with my limited mind and language, I agree. But I don’t see why this rules out me knowing things about God or being able to speak about God.

“I’d repeat the criticism, that speaking of God’s thoughts as occurring in God Himself (if you can grow to admit the thoughts are not like your thoughts), adds nothing to the definition of “necessary being,”

I never claimed it did. My point was that God’s thoughts are concrete objects and exist necessarily because God exists necessarily; hence, God’s thoughts are necessary beings.

“which you appear to use interchangeably with “God.””

I define a necessary being as a concrete object that exists necessarily. Nowhere in that definition is God referenced.

I defined God as an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being who has the further attributes of Aseity and Sovereignty. Nowhere in that definition is necessary existence referenced.

The two definitions are not interchangeable.

“ “ Definitions have subjects and predicates”

I disagree. There are many definitions within logic and mathematics that don’t have subjects and predicates.

“ Define “necessary being” apart from God.”

See above.

“. If many philosophers accept their existence, necessary existence isn’t reserved only for God for these philosophers.”

No. Necessary existence is a concept employed in philosophy all the time without reference to God. So the notion wasn’t cooked up by theologians to talk about God. That’s my point.

“ It’s an ad populum argument as you present it,”

No. An ad populum argument would be to say mathematical objects exist because most of these philosophers say they exist. That is not what I said.

“ Here the argument may be interesting and worthy of a new discussion. “

Agreed.

“ The question is whether any of these truths exists of itself, or if minds are required before the truth exists.”

And the trouble for me is that logicians and mathematicians are able to prove that mathematical and logical truths are necessarily true. So in a possible world where no human minds exist, it is still true that 2 + 2 =4 and that Pv~P, etc. . But then what, in a world without minds, makes these statements true? That’s what puzzles me, but maybe we shouldn’t open that can of worms.

“Reality quickly overwhelms any possible thought structures particularly down at the quantum level, and this fact shows the concepts arising around simple cases are indeed just thought structures and not inherent to existence or reality. “

Hmmm… But then that statement is just the result of a thought structure that isn’t about reality. So wouldn’t that make it false?

“In any case, before God creates there is no substance in which any mathematical truth could apply. Therefore in your admitted case where God does not create, where is math?”

God’s mind perhaps. I don’t know. It’s perplexing.

[Jabberwock]

We can define N which is not God, but still has aseity and sovereignity, and run a parallel argument that would prove its existence.

[Charles]

Yeah. Aseity and Sovereignty alone are doing the work here. So perhaps one could run a parallel argument where the being has Aseity and Sovereignty but doesn’t have any of the other omni properties.

Perhaps a way around this would be to run a Godelian-style proof for (2) in my argument, as I mentioned. Lacking omnipotence, etc. would not be a positive property, so that might be the symmetry breaker. I’d have to think about that.

[Charles]

I’ve thinking a little more about this. Perhaps one could argue that sovereignty requires omnipotence and omniscience. I don’t know about aseity, but one could run the argument with just sovereignty. Still, moral perfection doesn’t seem to be entailed by any other properties.

Perhaps an even more serious problem would be that one might be able to run the argument with a unitarian God (like Allah) and then run the same argument with a trinitarian conception of God (like the God of Christianity) and then prove that God is necessarily only one person and exactly three persons, a contradiction!

I appreciate your post. So far it is the best response I’ve seen on this thread.

Please feel free to contribute more if you have any other thoughts.

• This reply was modified 12 months ago by  Charles.

[Jabberwock]

Yes, that is the exact problem: we can quite easily define excluding necessities. That means that, if none of them is logically impossible, (at least) one must be metaphysically impossible. But that in turn means that the move from epistemic possibility to metaphysical possibility is unwarranted. God may seem possible, but we can know that he is truly (metaphysically) possible only if he actually exists.

[Charles]

I’m not sure I’m following your thought here. the problem you raise, as I see it, is that we can run a parallel argument using the same logic and derive a contradiction. So your point seems stronger than you present it here.

[Charles]

To make what I took to be your point more clearly:

Define “Allah” as an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, being who is sovereign and exists a se and is exactly one person.

Define “God” as omnipotent, etc. and exactly three persons.

We then run parallel arguments to the one above and can conclude that both Allah and God are identical to N. Thus God=Allah. Contradiction!

I’ll have to think more about this.

[Jabberwock]

Well, I tried to explain what is the reason for the contradiction.

[Charles]

And I had trouble understanding you.

Is it the reason I give above?

[Jabberwock]

The reason why we can run parallel arguments that end up in contradictions is because we make an unwarranted (in this particular case) move from epistemic possibility to metaphysical possibility. When you write:

Possibly, God exists.

what kind of possibility do you have in mind? The tricky part is that we quite often (if not almost always) have no problem with moving from epistemic possibility – ‘It seems that X is possible’ to metaphysical possibility ‘I see not reason for why X might not be possible, therefore I assume it is metaphysically possible’. The issue is that due to our ignorance what seems to be metaphysically possible actually might not be. This leaves us in a bit of a pickle: rejecting all metaphysical possibilities on those grounds would make our lives impossible, as they inform almost all our everyday decisions, on the other hand, accepting all epistemic possibilities as metaphysical ones leads us to contradictions. As you have pointed out:

2′ It is metaphysically possible that the Islamic God exists.

and

2” It is metaphysically possible that the triune God exists.

cannot be both true. If we acknowledge that the possibility is just epistemic, then there is no contradiction, but the argument loses its force. ‘There might be a possible world in which God exists’ is not sufficient for the conclusion.

[Charles]

I see what you are saying. It’s a point well taken.

[Charles]

Thinking more about what you said, it occurs to me that 2and 2can't both be metaphysically possible <i>only if a necessary being exists</i>. So if one is inclined to hold that both 2 and 2 are both metaphysically possible, one could argue that if a necessary being exists, God could not exist, since contradictions would follow.

This is an avenue atheists might want to pursue, a sort of inverse Gap Argument against God.

But as I’m a theist, I think your analysis concerning epistemic and metaphysical possibility is probably the correct analysis of what is going on.

[Charles]

Whoops! Let’s try that again:

Thinking more about what you said, it occurs to me that “Allah exists” and “The triune God exists” are only impossible if a necessary being exists. If one is inclined to think they are both metaphysically possible, one could argue that if a necessary being exists, God could not exist, since contradictions would follow.

This is an avenue atheists might want to pursue, a sort of inverse Gap Argument against God.

But as I’m a theist, I think your analysis concerning epistemic and metaphysical possibility is probably the correct analysis of what is going on.

• This reply was modified 11 months, 3 weeks ago by  Charles.

[Jabberwock]

Thinking more about what you said, it occurs to me that “Allah exists” and “The triune God exists” are only impossible if a necessary being exists. If one is inclined to think they are both metaphysically possible, one could argue that if a necessary being exists, God could not exist, since contradictions would follow.

Not exactly. A part of the issue is that your definition of God includes a transworld property, i.e. necessary existence, which pertains to all possible worlds. Thus a possible world without a necessary being is sufficient for all necessary beings to be impossible.

[Charles]

“A part of the issue is that your definition of God includes a Transworld property, i.e. necessary existence, which pertains to all possible worlds.”

Recall, I defined God as omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, and having the further properties of Aseity and Sovereignty. The way you get God as a necessary being is by showing that he’s identical to the necessary being postulated in (1). The point of my last thread is that, without (1), one may find the definition of God metaphysically possible — or more specifically, one may find the definitions of “Allah” and “The triune God” to both be metaphysically possible. Hence, if (1) is true, it’s metaphysically impossible for God to be identical to N, since, if he were, contradictions would follow.

• This reply was modified 11 months, 3 weeks ago by  Charles.

[Jabberwock]

Yes, I was pointing out that one can question also the first premise.

[kravarnik]

That’s not fruitful at all. You’re making unfounded and unjustified moves in your OP way too many times. It’s unclear how you establish that the cause we conclude from the cosmological argument doesn’t have “essential and absolute necessity”, but semantically define it standing in need of a cause.

Which is unfounded, because KCA, as far as I know, establishes absolute and essential necessity; or if not, and it only establishes relative and accidental necessity – akin to water being relatively necessary in relation to the existence of mud(since mud, necessarily, is water + dirt), but is not inherently and absolutely necessary, – then I see no analysis of how said relative necessity is explained by God.

I mean, you don’t even know that N’s being nature. Is it Plato’s logos? Is it the gnostics’ demiurge, which stands as cause of the universe, but is not God, but is between God <> Demiurge <> universe? How do you know the N/Demiurge’s nature, in order to argue it stands in need of God as cause of it?

Basically, you’re assuming most of what you’re saying and it becomes way too inexplicable at some point to even entertain this as meaningful contribution to the question/problem at hand.

[Charles]

There seems to be a lot of confusion concerning the logic of the argument, so I’ve been working on a more formal version in order to show the argument is valid:

N=a necessary being exists

G=God exists

A=God exists a se

S=God is sovereign

(G=N)=God is identical to N

1. N (Pr)

2. ◊G (Pr)

3. □[G→(A & S)] (Pr)

4. □[~(G=N)→~(A & S)] (Pr)

5. □I I G (Assume for ◊E)

6. N (1)

7. I ~(G=N) (Assume for RAA)

8. ~(A & S) ( 4, 7 □E, MP)

9. (A & S) (3, 5 □E, MP)

10. I G=N (7-9 RAA)

11. □I G=N (2,5-10 ◊E)

12. □(G=N) Q.E.D. (11 □I)

And here’s a slightly less technical version:

1. N exists (Pr)

2. ◊(God exists) (Pr)

3. □[(God exists)→[(God exists a se) & (God is sovereign)]] (Pr)

4. □[~(God=N)→~[(God exists a se) & (God is sovereign)]] (Pr)

5. □I I God exists (Assume for ◊E )

6. N exists (1 □E )

7. I~(God=N) (Assume for RAA)

8. ~[(God exists a se) & (God is sovereign)] (4,7 □E, MP)

9. (God exists a se) & (God is sovereign) (3, 5 □E, MP)

10. I God=N (7-9 RAA)

11. □I God=N (2,5-10 ◊E)

12. □(God=N) Q.E.D (11□I)

I sorry if this seems pedantic, but many times certain logical fallacies are alleged or very vague and general statements about the logic of the argument are given that frankly show the logic is not being understood.

Hopefully, we can move forward in the discussion by targeting the soundness of the argument instead of its validity.

[Charles]

Sorry! The post took away my spacing, making the scope lines unclear. Here’s a better version:

N=a necessary being exists

G=God exists

A=God exists a se

S=God is sovereign

G=N=God is identical to N

1. N

2. ◊G

3. □[G→(A & S)]

4. □[~(G=N)→~(A & S)]

5. □I I G (Assume for ◊E)

6. □I I N (1)

7. □I I I ~(G=N) (Assume for RAA)

8. □I I I ~(A & S) ( 4, 7 □E, MP)

9. □I I I (A & S) (3, 5 □E, MP)

10. □I I G=N (7-9 RAA)

11. □I G=N (2,5-10 ◊E)

12. □(G=N) Q.E.D. (11 □I)

1. □(N exists)

2. ◊(God exists)

3. □[(God exists)→[(God exists a se) & (God is sovereign)]]

4. □[~(God=N)→~[(God exists a se) & (God is sovereign)]]

5. □I I God exists (Assume for ◊E )

6. □I I N exists (1)

7. □I I I~(God=N) (Assume for RAA)

8. □I I I~[(God exists a se) & (God is sovereign)] (4,7 □E, MP)

9. □I I I(God exists a se) & (God is sovereign) (3, 5 □E, MP)

10. □I I God=N (7-9 RAA)

11. □I God=N (2,5-10 ◊E)

12. □(God=N) (11□I)

Sorry if the scope lines are confusing. I’ll see if I can work on a proof that doesn’t use them.

• This reply was modified 12 months ago by  Charles.

[Charles]

And for those who, like myself, find possible world semantics very useful, here’s a very informal deductive argument:

1. N exists. (Pr)

2. Possibly, God exists. (Pr)

3. If N exists and possibly God exists, then there is a possible world, W, where both God and N exist. (Pr)

4. Necessarily, God exists a se and is sovereign. (Pr)

5. If God is not identical to N in W, then God is not sovereign and does not exist a se in W. (Pr)

6. God exists a se and is sovereign in W. (from 3 and 4)

7. Therefore, God is identical to N in W. (from 5 and 6)

8. Therefore, God is identical to N. (from 7 and the necessity of identity)