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An Objection to Nelson Pike’s Argument on Free Will and Foreknowledge
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An Objection to Nelson Pike’s Argument on Free Will and Foreknowledge
Nelson Pike’s argument on free will and foreknowledge is outlined as follows in his work Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action:
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If God knows today that I will do X tomorrow, then it is necessary that I will do X tomorrow.
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If it is necessary that I will do X tomorrow, then I cannot refrain from doing X tomorrow.
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If I cannot refrain from doing X tomorrow, then I do not have free will regarding doing X tomorrow.
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Therefore, if God knows today that I will do X tomorrow, then I cannot do otherwise tomorrow.
I would like to refuse premise (1). Just because God foreknows an event doesn’t mean that event is necessary, it could entail possibility. Foreknowledge does not causally determine the event; rather, it is simply knowledge of what is going to happen in the future.
In addition, Pike’s argument assumes a particular understanding of free will, that is, the ability to do otherwise. However, this is not the only conception of free will. For example, compatibilism argues that free will is compatible with determinism or foreknowledge if it involves acting according to one’s desires, and motivations. Therefore, even if God foreknows our actions, as long as we act in accordance with our own will, we can still be morally responsible. What’s more, Pike’s argument further supposes a linear understanding of time in which the present precedes the future. However, God is eternal, in other words, timeless, in which God exists outside of time and encompasses all events simultaneously, from the past, the present, and the future, then God’s foreknowledge does not negate our freedom to choose otherwise.
As a result, my argument is as follows:
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God’s foreknowledge does not necessitate the occurrence of an event.
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God’s foreknowledge is compatible with human free will.
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Human free will entails the ability to make choices that are not causally determined by external factors.
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Therefore, God’s foreknowledge of human actions does not negate human free will.
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2 Replies
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1. If God knows today what I will do tomorrow, then it is necessary that I will do X tomorrow.
This repeats the modal scope fallacy that I have been pointing out in every other one of these threads. The premise says something like (where [] is the necessity operator) …
1. If God knows today that I do X tomorrow then []I do X tomorrow.
That is a modal scope fallacy that occurs as a result of the mishandling of the necessity operator, that should be placed like this …
1. [](If God knows today that I do X tomorrow then I do X tomorrow).
The necessity operator applies to the whole conditional premise, not just the antecedent as suggested in the original premise (1).
Modal (Scope) Fallacy (logicallyfallacious.com)
Once we correct the scope fallacy, nothing of interest follows because the consequent is no longer necessarily true. The conditional premise depicts what must be thought to hold under a logically possible set of circumstances given our definitions, and what must be thought to hold under a logically possible set of circumstances does not entail that the antecedent and consequent are non-contingent.
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This reply was modified 1 month ago by James.
logicallyfallacious.com
Modal logic studies ways in which propositions can be true or false, the most common being necessity and possibility. Some propositions are necessarily true/false, and others are possibly true/false. In short, a modal fallacy involves making a formal argument invalid … Continue reading
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Correction …
The necessity operator applies to the whole conditional premise, not just the antecedent as suggested in the original premise (1).
… should have read …
The necessity operator applies to the whole conditional premise, not just the consequent as suggested in the original premise (1).
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This reply was modified 1 month ago by
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