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Argue Against the Incompatibility of Free Will and Foreknowledge
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Argue Against the Incompatibility of Free Will and Foreknowledge
To say that God is omniscient is to say that God possesses complete and unlimited knowledge about the past, present, and future. Conversely, to deny God’s attribute of omniscience, then, is to say that there is at least one fact/truth that God does not know or is wrong. Jonathan Edwards, an 18th century philosophical theologian argue for the incompatibility of free will and divine foreknowledge, “If there be any such thing as a divine foreknowledge of the volitions of free agents, that foreknowledge, by the supposition, is a thing which already has, and long ago had existence. And now its existence is necessary; it is now utterly impossible to be otherwise, than that this foreknowledge should be or should have been”, and he argues as follows:
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We have no choice about past events.
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In the past, God had foreknowledge of our future actions.
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We have no choice about God knowing that in the future I will perform a certain action. (1,2)
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If God knows that we will perform certain actions, then we have no choice to act otherwise.
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If we have no choice about p, and no choice about the fact that ‘if p, then q,’ then we have no choice about q.
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Therefore, we have no free will. (4,5)
Edwards assumes that God’s foreknowledge of our actions entails determinism, that is, our actions are predetermined and we could not have acted otherwise than we actually do.
However, I would like to refute premise (4). Thomas Aquinas argues that, “…His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above … Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality.” Aquinas proposes that God’s knowledge encompassess all events simultaneously, from the past, the present, and the future, and that God’s foreknowledge is not based on determinism, but on his timeless/eternal nature that transcends all possibilities, including the choices humans will make freely.
As such, my argument is as follows:
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We have no choice about past events.
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In the past, God had foreknowledge of our future actions.
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God’s foreknowledge encompasses all possible outcomes, reflecting his timeless awareness of all possibilities rather than determining specific events.
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Our actions are not causally determined by God’s foreknowledge but are the result of our own free choices and volition.
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Therefore, God’s foreknowledge does not negate our freedom to choose otherwise.
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Therefore, we do have free will.
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3 Replies
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There are already two threads on this exact topic.
Let’s say that I can do X or Y at noon today and that X and Y are mutually exclusive. My doing X entails not doing Y and vice versa. There is a possible world in which I do X at noon today. In that possible world, God currently foreknows that I do X at noon today. There is another possible world in which I do Y at noon today and in that possible world, God timelessly knows that I do Y at noon today. If I am acting freely, which of those possible worlds the actual world becomes, is solely down to me. If I do X, God will currently foreknow X and if I do Y, God will currently foreknow Y. This does not entail that God’s foreknowledge determines my actions but it does entail that my actions determine what God timelessly knows about me. But for what God knows timelessly, that knowledge is eternal and without beginning. How can something that is timeless and without beginning and that necessarily exists in the absence of and temporarily prior to an event, be casually impacted by that event? To the best of our knowledge, it cannot and your premise 1 concedes that it cannot.
None of this entails that I am not acting in freely and neither does any of this entail that the universe lacks an intelligent cause. It does seem to entail the non-existence of an intelligent cause possession of the type of foreknowledge described. The real problem is premise (1).
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Hi Baili, I like the argument against God’s timeless nature. I also have a problem with it since it does not solve the problem of Theological Fatalism but simply rewords it. However, For the argument that you have laid out I want to object to premise 4.
The basic crux of the objection to premise 4 is that if God’s foreknowledge encompasses all possible outcomes, including our own individual choices, then some might argue that our choices are not really free and are already “known” and thus still concerns Theological Fatalism. Even though God has prior knowledge of our actions and that He did not cause them, since our actions are already known wouldn’t that entail that our actions are predetermined?
Another objection to Premise 4 could stem from the argument of Middle knowledge, which are “knowledge that God possesses logically prior to His decree to create the world and it consists of conditional statements about what free creatures would do were they placed in circumstances”. This meant that God could possibly know all possible scenarios. If God knows all possible scenarios, doesn’t this mean that our actions whether we have several options, or that we have the capacity to choose, are predetermined?
Another noteworthy contention in regards to God not causing our actions even though he has knowledge of it is to ask about the causal nature of reality. If God did not cause me to do a certain action, then what caused it in the first place? It seems to me since everything came from God and that God has the power of Foreknowledge then whatever we do, we are stuck in a false belief of Free Will.
In sum, I think I have done an adequate job in regards to objecting to premise 4. I feel as though Free Will in itself is just a false belief. If God has foreknowledge and he knows that I will do something, it means that I have no free will.
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God’s knowledge of all possibilities (what a person is able to do, for example) does not entail that he possesses a knowledge of what they will do, ahead of them doing it. For example.
Possible world 1 : I do X at noon today.
Possible world 2: I do Y at noon today.
Possible world 3: I do Z at noon today.God knowing that all these worlds are metaphysically possible (they are all possible outcomes) prior to noon today does not entail that he currently knows which of these worlds, the actual world will become later. Even if he lacks that knowledge, Baili’s (3) is still true!
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