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Miracles and the issue of semantics
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Miracles and the issue of semantics
David Hume categorizes miracles as simply the improbable, miracles are the least likely event to occur, therefore they are improbable. The improbability of miracles makes them nearly impossible to be made known as fact. That is because the study of history is looking at what most probably occurred. So you would not be able to prove that miracles have occurred through history. But I think one of the issues with Hume’s definition of a miracle is that it doesn’t include anything about divine intervention. Although you could claim that divine intervention is improbable, the definition of a miracle needs to encapsulate or state that quality of divine intervention.
I would claim that not all miracles need to be improbable as long as they can be defined as divine intervention. The improbability of something is subjective to personal belief. Even using Bayes probability calculator you put your own opinion about the probability into its system to provide you with a biased calculation. All a miracle needs to contain is an element of divine intervention. Divine intervention isn’t always improbable, especially when you are surrounded by its occurrence on a more consistent basis. But just because of its frequency or our expectation of its occurrence doesn’t take away from the fact that it is still a miracle. I would argue that improbability infers divine intervention of some sort, but divine intervention does not infer improbability. Therefore I suggest that Hume’s definition of a miracle is a flawed representation of the true meaning of the word, thus his premise does not stand. A miracle isn’t simply improbable, but it is any form of divine intervention. With this definition his argument that history can not prove miracles because history is the study of what most probably occurred is no longer sound.
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1 Reply
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Hume didn’t define miracles as the improbable. He discussed the problem with establishing the past occurrence of a miracle based on testimony: “no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavors to establish.”
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