[jayceeii]

The argument fails to take the angels into account. One can argue that “divine perfection” is the right term to describe a pure soul, which is to say without any remaining negativity. Such a one can also be said to have a “perfectly inoffensive personality.” Since there are no evil motions in the mind they’re constantly pleasing to God and warm to the neighbor.

You are right to say that since you are a creature, God necessarily exists or you wouldn’t be able to say that or anything. God necessarily exists, before there can be a creation. The creation implies God’s existence. But people haven’t understood, God’s power must increase. If the universe is expanding, this is a measure of the power He is putting into it.

[Lelouch]

“The argument fails to take angels into account”

This objection is not relevant to the argument. The argument is specifically about God, not angels, and it is focused on the qualities that define divine perfection. While angels may also have certain qualities, the argument is not concerned with them.

You suggested that divine perfection can be related to a pure soul without any remaining negativity. However, the argument is about the qualities that define divine perfection, and it does not exclude the possibility that a pure soul may also possess those qualities.

You suggested that the expansion of the universe is evidence of God’s increasing power. This does not directly address the argument about the necessary existence of God based on the qualities of divine perfection.

You raised quite a lot of tangential points, but they do not offer a successful refutation or debunking of the argument. The argument is based on sound logic and supported by the concept of necessary existence, which is a well-established philosophical idea.

[jayceeii]

The phrase “divine perfection” should not be given to God alone, but also to the angels. But the angels do not possess the quality of necessary existence. Thus the argument is ambiguous, having defined the divine sector in a way which does not exclude the angels.

The idea of necessary existence in philosophy is vague. I can only interpret it as something the created must say in reference to the Creator. Other ideas about God’s necessary existence consign Him to a nearly inanimate condition, like atomic theory.

Premise 1: If a being possesses all the qualities of divine perfection (and is not an angel), then that being also possesses the quality of necessary existence.
Premise 2: God is a being that possesses all the qualities of divine perfection (and is not an angel).
Conclusion: Therefore, God necessarily exists.

But necessary existence is then something that is assumed only by theists, not atheists. So the argument becomes circular, you have both presumed and defined necessary existence.

[Lelouch]

You raise some interesting points, but there are several issues with them.

First, the objection that the term “divine perfection” should not be given to God alone, but also to angels, is not accurate. While angels are often depicted as beings of great power and beauty, they are not considered to be divine in the same way that God is. God is considered to be the creator of angels and the ultimate source of their power. Therefore, it makes sense to reserve the term “divine perfection” for God alone.

The objection that the concept of necessary existence is vague is also problematic. Necessary existence is a well-defined philosophical concept that refers to the idea that certain things must exist in order for the world to make sense. For example, many philosophers argue that mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4, exist necessarily because they are true in all possible worlds. Similarly, the concept of God as a necessary being is based on the idea that if God did not exist, the world would be fundamentally different and less coherent. This is not a vague or arbitrary concept, but rather a logical necessity.

The objection that the argument is circular because it assumes the existence of God is also flawed. The argument does not assume the existence of God, but rather derives the existence of God from the concept of divine perfection and necessary existence. The argument is valid regardless of whether one is a theist or an atheist.

• This reply was modified 1 year ago by  Lelouch.

[jayceeii]

LL: First, the objection that the term “divine perfection” should not be given to God alone, but also to angels, is not accurate. While angels are often depicted as beings of great power and beauty, they are not considered to be divine in the same way that God is. God is considered to be the creator of angels and the ultimate source of their power. Therefore, it makes sense to reserve the term “divine perfection” for God alone.

JC: No, the word “divine” must be applied to the pure souls, who have no sin in them. If you like you can say angels are divine and God is DIVINE, or coin another term for it. The point is that the angels are compatible with the Creator. He could build a society with them and be pleased. That isn’t so about the human race, who offend the Lord constantly.

LL: The objection that the concept of necessary existence is vague is also problematic. Necessary existence is a well-defined philosophical concept that refers to the idea that certain things must exist in order for the world to make sense. For example, many philosophers argue that mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4, exist necessarily because they are true in all possible worlds. Similarly, the concept of God as a necessary being is based on the idea that if God did not exist, the world would be fundamentally different and less coherent. This is not a vague or arbitrary concept, but rather a logical necessity.

JC: I think what we have here is a word jam, which is a linguistic log jam. If you could persuade the masses there was any meaning in this paragraph, you’d prove God exists. Instead I see no meaning in it, and you’re left agreeing only with those who pretend they see meaning in it too. If God did not exist there would be no creation, no world. He is called necessary by His creation. He isn’t forced to be necessary some other strange way.

Another meaning which I would allow is that necessary beings cannot be extinguished. God is necessary but the creatures are not because God could dissolve their souls or leave them hanging eternally in space, nonfunctional. You are not a necessary being, therefore.

LL: The objection that the argument is circular because it assumes the existence of God is also flawed. The argument does not assume the existence of God, but rather derives the existence of God from the concept of divine perfection and necessary existence. The argument is valid regardless of whether one is a theist or an atheist.

JC: Everything comes down to what you mean by “necessary,” that seems empty to me. Maybe start a new thread so you can fill in what this means and thus persuade the masses.

[Charles]

“The objection that the argument is circular because it assumes the existence of God is also flawed.”

It depends on how you interpret (2) of your argument. It’s vague as stated, and can be interpreted as implying God’s existence.

[Johan]

It sounds like your premise 1 might beg the question. What is your support for it ?

[Lelouch]

Your question is a reasonable one, and it’s worth addressing. However, I believe that premise 1 of the argument is not inherently question-begging, and there are good reasons to support it.

First, it’s important to clarify what it means for a being to possess the quality of necessary existence. Necessary existence is a property that some philosophers attribute to God and abstract entities, such as mathematical objects. It means that the entity in question exists in all possible worlds, by virtue of its own nature, rather than being contingent on external factors.

With this in mind, let’s examine premise 1 of the argument. The premise states that if a being possesses all the qualities of divine perfection, then it also possesses the quality of necessary existence. This is a claim that some philosophers have defended, based on the idea that necessary existence is a necessary condition for divine perfection.

To support this claim, some philosophers have argued that a being that lacks necessary existence would be dependent on external factors for its existence, and thus would not be truly perfect. For example, if God were not necessarily existent, then His existence would depend on some external cause or condition, which would limit His power and perfection.

Moreover, some philosophers have argued that necessary existence is a logical consequence of some of the other divine attributes, such as immutability and simplicity. For example, if God were not necessarily existent, then He would be subject to change or composition, which would undermine His perfection.

Therefore, it’s not question-begging to assert that if a being possesses all the qualities of divine perfection, then it also possesses the quality of necessary existence. This claim is supported by philosophical arguments and is not simply assumed without justification.

• This reply was modified 1 year ago by  Lelouch.

[Johan]

Necessary existence being a great making property is certainty a claim that philosophers have made in the past, but I have seen nothing more than assertions being made about it. There has been no way that I am aware of to show that it is actually a thing in reality, or that it actually is a great making property.

I don’t think existence is a property of a thing, but rather a state that a thing exists in. Because of that, something cannot possess the property of existing. Something is red, or is small, or is bouncy, but you would never say it is existence. (it is even sounds grammatically wrong).

When I dig into the rest of your post, it seems to be saying that “If God did not possess the property of necessary existence then God would not exist”. And the problem with that is? Perhaps the simplest solution to this problem is that no being is actually necessarily existent and therefore God simply doesn’t exist. Why go through all the hoops to try to argue for the alternative when that is so simple and elegant of a solution to the problem?

Also, if anything that is immutable and simple necessarily exists, then we end up with contradictions because I can define mutually exclusive simple and immutable things. Likewise, I could define a near infinite number of Gods with mutually exclusive properties. These Gods, by definition cannot all exist, so there is obviously some flaw in the reasoning here.

Finally, you are talking about God having limits to his power. This also isn’t a problem for modern theology. Most philosophers have gone far away from the omni traits that were once ascribed to God because of the logical problems that exist. God instead is maximally great. Maximally great is limited, by definition, so having limits isn’t a problem it seams.

[Jabberwock]

Premise 1: If a being possesses all the qualities of divine perfection, then that being also possesses the quality of necessary existence.

Premise 2: If God does not exist, he does not possess all the qualities of divine perfection.

Conclusion: Therefore, God does not exist necessarily.

[Charles]

I take your point here, but I don’t think your argument is valid as stated. I think you need to add some premises to it.

[Jabberwock]

How do we know that God possesses all the qualities of divine perfection? If it is by definition, then it is a case of defining into existence. Suppose I run the following argument:
1. A pink unicorn is defined as a being that has a property of having a single horn, has a property of having a pink color and has a property of existence.

2. If a pink unicorn has a property of existence, then it exists.
3. Therefore, a pink unicorn exists.

[Charles]

“How do we know that God possesses all the qualities of divine perfection?”

One would define God as possessing all the properties of divine perfection. I think that’s fair as I think we can define terms however we want.

I think the real question is why think necessary existence is amongst the divine perfections.

” If it is by definition, then it is a case of defining into existence.”

It depends. Take the proposition:

P: Necessarily, God possesses all the divine perfections.

There’s two things that could mean. First, it might mean something like:

Necessarily, God exists and God possesses all the divine perfections.

That’s not so much defining God into existence as simply stating that God exists.

But one could interpret P as:

Necessarily, if God exists, then God possesses all the divine perfections.

And this isn’t defining God into existence any more than:

If a unicorn exists, then it has a horn.

In your parallel argument, I take it that a unicorn having the property of existence is the same as saying it exists. So your premise (2) would be like the second interpretation of P above.

[Johan]

I can see some merit in the re-wording, but it basically sounds like:

“God possesses all of the qualities that God possesses”.

While true, this is trivial. Now we have to ask “Is existence a quality one can possess?”, and “If so, how can we know that God is possession of such a quality?”. People might try to argue that existence is a great making property and therefore would be something that God would possess, but wouldn’t it be even greater to create something while not even existing? I know that seems to be out of the realm of possibility, but I can’t see any direct logical contradiction with it.

Lets say that you reject that though, which is a greater being:

A) God A who sacrifices their entire being to create a universe.
B) God B who creates the universe but still persists

On the surface, God B is greater because they still exist, but on another level God A performed the ultimate self sacrifice, thus being greater. This highlights the problem with “great” as it is a purely subjective term.

[Charles]

“I can see some merit in the re-wording, but it basically sounds like:

“God possesses all of the qualities that God possesses”.

It might logically imply that, but it doesn’t mean that. And I think God existing necessarily is not a trivial statement.

” Now we have to ask “Is existence a quality one can possess?”, and “If so, how can we know that God is possession of such a quality?”.”

The issue is not existence but necessary existence.

I take your point about great making properties. What makes a property great or greater than another property is difficult to define. I would agree that the omni properties are plausibly great making properties, but whether or not necessary existence is a great making property is the key issue, and this isn’t clear to me.

• This reply was modified 11 months, 3 weeks ago by  Charles.

[Johan]

I don’t really think that necessary existence or existence would have different methodologies.

I don’t think that existence is a property of a thing itself. A thing exists, if and only if it has a referent in the external world. This makes things complicated though because that means if the external world ceased to exist, then everything else would lack the property of existence. This is a problem for those who claim that God exists outside the external world.

If something can exist outside of the external world, then clearly my definition of existence I listed above is wrong, but then what does it mean to exist?

[Charles]

To answer your last question, I take existence to be a primitive definition that can’t be further defined.

I don’t know what you mean by existence and necessary existence having similar methodologies.

I don’t take necessary existence as a property or predicate, so for me it doesn’t run into the same Kantian criticism that existence isn’t a predicate.

I would define the “world” as everything that exists. So if God exists, he wouldn’t exist outside the world. He would exist outside the physical universe, but that’s different.

[Jabberwock]

But one could interpret P as: 
Necessarily, if God exists, then God possesses all the divine perfections.

Sure, but then God exists necessarily only if he exists, so the argument no longer works.

[Charles]

” but then God exists necessarily only if he exists”

The second interpretation of P doesn’t state that directly, but, given premise (1), it follows that if God exists, he exists necessarily, which I think is what you’re getting at. But that’s no small statement, since if that statement is true, it follows that if God possibly exists, then he necessarily exists (given S5).

“the argument no longer works.”

If you mean the original post’s argument, I agree. But my formulation of the argument does “work” in the sense that it’s valid (the conclusion logically follows from the premises), though it may still be unsound. To quote that argument:

1. Necessarily, if a being possesses all the qualities of divine perfection, then that being also possesses the quality of necessary existence.

2. Necessarily, If God exists, then God possesses all the qualities of divine perfection.

3. Possibly, God exists.

4. Therefore, God necessarily exists.

And a rough sketch of the logic would be that, given (3), God exists in a possible world, W, and in W God posses all the qualities of divine perfection, given (2). Therefore, God exists necessarily in W, given (1). Therefore, God exists in every possible world (given the definition of ‘necessary’). Therefore, (4).

• This reply was modified 11 months, 3 weeks ago by  Charles.

[Jabberwock]

That formulation suffers from the same issue as the argument in the other thread, i.e. while atheists might be willing to concede epistemic possibility of God, they are not obliged to accept it as a metaphysical possibility.

[Charles]

Right. I wasn’t defending the argument as sound, but only showing a valid formulation of the original post’s argument.

[kravarnik]

Seems like too abstract and hypothetical ramblings. Premise 1 and 2 are inexplicable and would need some working out, because ordered and stated as such make no sense.

How would one know what are “divine qualities of perfection”, before establishing that God exists? That’s like me never seeing a dog, nor knowing of its existence, but claiming to know what would be “doggish qualities that make doggish perfection”. But how would I know “doggish perfection” without first knowing the Dog that exists and exemplifies those?

The argument seems to erect hypothetical divine qualities, then insert a word that is postulated to have said qualities, and then on the basis of this word having those presumably divine qualities, then that word must also have necessary existence.

But all of this seems purely semantic, rather than substantial. How do you know what divine qualities for perfection are and that there’s a being that has them, in order to have premise 1 and 2 make sense and be true? Isn’t that putting the cart before the horse? And how is all of this not a purely abstract and hypothetical argument?

[Charles]

I think the argument is invalid as stated:

Premise 1: If a being possesses all the qualities of divine perfection, then that being also possesses the quality of necessary existence.

Premise 2: God is a being that possesses all the qualities of divine perfection.

Conclusion: Therefore, God necessarily exists.

Because (2) either means something like “God exists and God has all the qualities of divine perfection” or “If God exists, then he has all the qualities of divine perfection.” If it’s the first meaning, the argument is circular, but if it’s the latter meaning, then the conclusion doesn’t logically follow from the premises.

I think a better formulation of the argument (and one which expresses what I think Lelouch is trying to get at) would be:

1. Necessarily, if a being possesses all the qualities of divine perfection, then that being also possesses the quality of necessary existence.

2. Necessarily, If God exists, then God possesses all the qualities of divine perfection.

3. Possibly, God exists.

4. Therefore, God necessarily exists.

And a rough sketch of the logic would be that, given (3), God exists in a possible world, W, and in W God posses all the qualities of divine perfection, given (2). Therefore, God exists necessarily in W, given (1). Therefore, God exists in every possible world (given the definition of ‘necessary’). Therefore, (4).

[Johan]

You basically just changed the argument to the moa.

It suffers from the same problems that the moa does. You have no justification for the premise that “possibly god exists”, because in the moa that translates to “god exists in some possible world.”. What support so you have for that ?

I would agree with the premise that either god exists or god is impossible but for some definitions of god, both options are impossible to support.

[Charles]

“You basically just changed the argument to the moa.”

Right. It seems to me the argument as originally stated is either question begging or invalid. The moa version I gave is at least valid, though it may be unsound or have an unjustified premise, as you point out.

• This reply was modified 11 months, 3 weeks ago by  Charles.