[seán s. (nonbeliever)]

And if someone is injured or dies following this advice, will Craig shift the blame to them?

seán s.

[James]

I remember this causing quite the stir when it first released and what was very odd (bear in mind that Craig is a qualified philosopher) is that Craig apparently did not understand why his comment had caused such a reaction. Taking this approach is exactly why people end up getting scammed on the internet. Has he never heard the saying “if it seems too good to be true”?

[seán s. (nonbeliever)]

How does one become a “qualified philosopher”? Do they have to pass their boards?

seán s.

• This reply was modified 2 weeks, 3 days ago by  seán s. (nonbeliever).

[James]

I’m not sceptical of someone’s claim to be a professional philosopher. It simply means they have a degree in philosophy and have thus studied what people think and why they think it. They are also lifelong learners who continue to study current epistemic trends. Such a person shouldn’t be surprised when an admission of lowering the epistemic bar causes a stir (or they should at least take the time to study why their claim has garnered such a strong response)!

Dr. Craig is a priori committed to the notion that fundamentally, people fail to become Christians because they resist the Holy Spirt and not due to lack of evidence, internal incoherence of the Christian position or anything like that. Holding to this position a priori cannot fail to compromise Dr. Craig’s ability to objectively evaluate others’ objections to his position and sadly, as with many other Christians, his bias continually leaks out. Why do I say that the commitment is a priori? Because he admits that he should continue to assume it reliable, even if the arguments and evidence and demonstrated inadequate.

Sadly, this type of commitment seems to continue to compromise his response here. We get a pejorative (atheist bloggers have become “unjustifiably apoplectic”) but nothing of substance which demonstrates an understanding of their position (this would include a summary of their claims, a quick summary of why this position has been adopted by the sceptic, followed by a summary in which this is demonstrated unreasonable).

I’ve now read the article in full (it is very short) and will give a full response before long.

[Poul]

Trusting in the effect of prayer is obviously very bad advice. Presumably, the reason theists around here don’t come to the defense of Craig or of the idea of prayer in general is that they do not have a defense for either. Craig’s original position was that if there is just one chance in a million that this (i.e. Christianity) is true it’s worth believing. Another huge problem for Craig’s position is that by the same token, you could argue that we should believe in the effectiveness of prayer because of the enormous benefit we would enjoy if prayer was actually effective. I suppose christians realise that they are not effective and so they are uncomfortable with the cognitive dissonance this brings to the very idea that you can have a relationship with God.

Logically equivalent, if there is any chance of winning a lottery, we should be sure to buy a ticket. Not only that, we should buy a ticket in each and every lottery. Craig has since (on Capturing Christianity) explained that one chance in a million should not be understood literally but simply as any chance or something similar. I don’t think it helps his position.

[James]

Even if you think you are not, admitting that you would believe on a 1-in-a-million chance does not come across well. It is obviously wishful thinking and as such, has been made the subject of comedy. Even if one later backtracks (saying, it was non-literal), the possibility has been opened up that one’s desire for the belief to be true has already compromised one’s ability to evaluate the available evidence objectively.

Dumb and Dumber – One in a Million (youtube.com)

[James]

Trusting in the effect of prayer is obviously very bad advice.

It is an established fact that in certain faith healing contexts, people have died from the conditions from which they were declared healed (in the context of the meeting) and where they have abandoned prescribed treatments. Out of fairness to Craig, he does not advocate the abandonment of treatments when praying for relief.

Presumably, the reason theists around here don’t come to the defense of Craig or of the idea of prayer in general is that they do not have a defense for either …

Hm. Christians would argue that God uses modern interventions to execute healings (for example, you will hear prayers asking God to guide the hands of the surgeon etc). This is a retreat into an unfalsifiable position where the efficacy of prayer cannot actually be tested in an ethical way.

Craig’s original position was that if there is just one chance in a million that this (i.e. Christianity) is true it’s worth believing. Another huge problem for Craig’s position is that by the same token, you could argue that we should believe in the effectiveness of prayer because of the enormous benefit we would enjoy if prayer was actually effective. I suppose christians realise that they are not effective and so they are uncomfortable with the cognitive dissonance this brings to the very idea that you can have a relationship with God.

If God seemingly doesn’t answer a prayer then he has answered by saying no but again, this is a retreat into an unfalsifiable position. Out of a desire for it to be true, one has retreated into a position where the belief cannot be demonstrated false, and even if it is. I agree with you that this requires some cognitive dissonance because, in what other area of life would we do this?

Logically equivalent, if there is any chance of winning a lottery, we should be sure to buy a ticket.

If we don’t buy a ticket, there is zero chance of winning. Buying a ticket raises the odds to greater than zero so the act of buying a ticket is justified because the act impacts on whether the chances are zero or low, but greater than zero. Believing that Christianity is true has no impact on whether it will turn out to be true.

[James]

Prepare for usual brain farts ….

Atheistic bloggers have been unjustifiably apoplectic about my response to Kyle, so I’m glad for this opportunity to clarify my answer.

Apoplectic? I’ve not seen any angry responses from the usual atheists online.

The first step is to correctly understand Kyle’s question (which can be found here). He did not say that “he should abandon the faith if high epistemic confidence could not be achieved.” Kyle’s claim was far more radical than that. He implied that in order for Christian belief to be epistemically justified he would need to experience a personal appearance of the Virgin Mary or of Jesus himself!

Right. So evidence that is no different to that which was allegedly required by the original disciples before they would believe. And (assuming it all true for the sake of argument) unlike us (and Kyle) they had the added benefit of seeing Jesus perform miracles for 3 years prior to his death and so on. In other words, they had less inductive warrant for excluding a miracle yet still needed Jesus to appear.

In addition, this is about consistency in relation to such claims. Claims of Marian visitations are far more numerous and up to date than the original appearance claims made in relation to Jesus. So on the epistemic standard for believing claims of resurrection, we should all be believing they happened. Yet many Christians reject them (along with Catholicism). But why? We have multiple eyewitness testimonies and (unlike what we find in the Bible) many of them are written by the eyewitnesses themselves!

This demand sets the epistemic bar so extravagantly high that it would preclude virtually any person alive today from Christian belief.

That the bar is extravagant is purely a subjective opinion on Craig’s part. If Christ was raised and alive now, it doesn’t seem very extravagant to me. It seems like a perfectly reasonable standard of evidence to need (it’s what the earliest disciples needed and I don’t see them being accused of needing extravagant evidence) and one that an omnipotent God could easily provide. It is also consistent with his desire that everyone believe or be left without excuse. Such a standard only precludes Christian belief because nobody (including Craig) expects God to provide that level of evidence (and can be confident that he won’t). But if it is all true, why such a low expectation? If it is true, why find it an extravagant level of evidence?

I could have responded to Kyle simply by pointing out that we have good epistemic justification for Christian belief (arguments of natural theology plus Christian evidences), and that his standard for rational belief was unrealistically high. But I chose to take a different tack.

Natural theology? If that evidence works, it only shows that atheism is likely false and not that Christianity is true … so why mention that? And it is exactly the quality of the currently available “Christian evidences” that is being raised as potentially inadequate given the cost of following … so pointing back to it doesn’t address the issue raised.

God is omnipotent. How on earth can the standard be called “unrealistically high” in a context where it is being assumed true? This prima facie doesn’t even make sense. No amount of evidence that doesn’t involve an appearance by a risen Jesus can be as strong as an appearance by the risen Jesus. And we are left asking the question, why are the reports of Marian visitations more numerous (and more up to date) than those of alleged appearances of Jesus?

Sometimes one can be pragmatically justified in holding a belief even though one is not epistemically justified in holding that belief. A well-known example in the literature invites you to imagine that you have been diagnosed with stage-4 cancer. The prognosis is grim: the treatment will probably not be effective, and you do not have long to live.

In these circumstances, thinking positively is epistemically justified via knowledge of the placebo effect. In other words, it is warranted by the fact that the positive approach may have an impact on prognosis and indeed, has a history of doing so. In the case of Christian belief, believing it is true has absolutely no impact on whether the belief is actually true or not so this is comparing apples and oranges.

Nevertheless, studies show that cancer patients who believe that they will make it through their illness have a better chance of survival than those who do not. Having a positive, optimistic attitude is actually conducive to health, so that your chances of survival are greater if you believe that you will make it.

Because of the placebo effect!

So what would you do? If you believe only what is epistemically justified, then you doom yourself. Therefore you are pragmatically justified in believing that you will make it, even if such a belief is contrary to the evidence.

Knowledge of the placebo effect provides the epistemic warrant for taking a positive approach. The positive approach is epistemically warranted because the positive approach is known to impact the outcome. Even then, we wouldn’t encourage someone to think positively instead of receiving treatment! If there was no evidence thinking positively was helpful to the outcome, the positive approach wouldn’t be warranted. Under circumstances where this approach has no known impact on the truth or falsity of a claim, it doesn’t apply and is nothing more than wishful thinking.

My claim is that the costs typically associated with Christian belief are minimal in view of the love, joy, peace, patience, etc. that well up in the life of a Spirit-filled Christian and that, more importantly, any such costs are simply swamped by the infinite benefit of eternal life and a relationship with God, an incommensurable good.

If people treat the thinking as reliable and apply it to other areas of their lives (eg, when dealing with interactions online), it undeniably places them at risk. People then need to engage in cognitive dissonance to avoid placing themselves at risk elsewhere and so on.

If I was told that a drug had a one in a million chance of working, then of course I would take it. This is because the drug would likely have been tried on one million people and one of those people were observed to recover (hence, the statistic). It wouldn’t be rational for me to form a belief in a context where my believing could have no impact on the truth / falsity of the claim I’m being asked to accept.

Epistemic justification is conducive to truth because one is seeking truth-directed reasons for belief, that is, reasons to think that the belief is true.

Right. But in order to do that and remain objective, one must start by forming a concept of what evidence would convince you under circumstances where the claim is true, assess whether the circumstances of the claim being true would allow for the evidence to be provided and then assess whether that type of evidence is actually there. This is actually an antidote to wishful thinking.

In a context where a claim is true, God can easily provide the evidence (and is willing to answer prayer etc), the evidence is being requested by someone who is non-resistant to remove all reasonable doubt, God wants that person to believe and leave them without excuse (etc, etc), there is absolutely nothing wrong with or to fear from raising the bar to the level that is extravagant (in Craig’s opinion). Indeed and in such a context, shouldn’t we expect that making the request increases the likelihood of it happening (as a result of God answering prayer, Mark 11:4 and so on) because in such a context, the request should be believed to have an impact on the likelihood of evidence being presented?

The Power of the Placebo & Placebo Effect (youtube.com)

[Jabberwock]

We do not even have to mention disciples, it is enough to consider Paul. He has persecuted Christians until God has directly spoken to him in a clear and unmistakable way. Obviously, we need to assume that he would not have believed any other way. So, God could give any atheist the exact same experience. If any of them would not believe in the Christian God anyway, then we might safely assume that in such case God is simply epistemically unavailable to him (God cannot let himself be known to that person, which would make his omnipotence questionable) – but then expecting that he believes on evidence given by apologists, if even God’s direct message would not work, is simply unreasonable.

[James]

Paul is an extremely good example because he denied the resurrection and was actively hostile to the message (despite not being an atheist). Because of this past behaviour of God’s and in the face of such hostile non-belief, we would expect him to raise the level of evidence given the current trends of people moving away from Christianity etc. The only recourse for the Christian is to retreat into an unfalsifiable position but then the request that a non-Christian has a burden to disprove their position then becomes irrational. Saying that an appearance would make no difference for some doesn’t resolve the situation either because God wants to leave people without excuse and not merely save them.